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Archive for the ‘Bond Ratings’ Category

Harrisburg Burns

Wednesday, October 26th, 2011

We have written about Harrisburg PA.s struggle extensively during the past two years. A small city unable to pay off a jumbo-sized debt hasn’t shaken the muni market. Despite eye-catching headlines recently over Harrisburg bankruptcy filing, the news barely fazed other muni investors and probably rightly so.

A Messy Situation

Harrisburg’s financial woes stem from an incinerator originally built in 1972. Plagued with operating problems from the start, the city nevertheless decided to expand and retrofit the plant in 2003, taking on $125 million in debt. The initial contractor on the job went belly up, which led to more borrowing and debt that mushroomed to $310 million – a daunting sum for a city of 49,000 residents and a total municipal budget of less than $60 million. Ultimately, the city filed for bankruptcy, which the state is currently challenging in court.

Bonds Are Insured

Although Harrisburg’s move was unusual, the market hardly took notice. Harrisburg is not a significant issuer of bonds, and its financial plight has been well documented. A good portion of Harrisburg’s overall debt is insured, and many of the bonds associated with the incinerator are secured by Assured Guaranty, which made some payments the city previously missed. However, Assured credit rating has been lowered several times from AAA to where it is today.

While there are other cities and municipalities face strained finances, few are confronted with challenges similar to Harrisburg’s. Defaults continue to be extremely rare. Last year, municipal defaults totaled $2.65 billion, an 8.6% decline from 2009. So far this year, defaults total $1.1 billion, a small fraction of the $2.93 trillion in outstanding municipal bonds.

In the meantime, a judge placed Harrisburg’s bankruptcy on hold for a month, enabling bond insurers to file briefs in the case while state lawmakers are pushing to take over the city’s finances. Soon after Harrisburg filed for bankruptcy, the state sued, concurring with the mayor’s opposition to the filing. Harrisburg’s City Council voted three times over the summer to reject a financial recovery plan under the state’s program for distressed communities. All the decisions were carried by a 4-3 margin. The measure on October 12th to file bankruptcy was approved by the same 4-3 margin.

SEC suspects leaks at ratings agencies.

Sunday, October 2nd, 2011

Strike up another body blow against the big three credit ratings agencies. The SEC said the in-house procedures of one of the world’s top three ratings agencies has been leaking its decisions in advance of public dissemination, according to a report by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

While no agencies were named in the report, at one of the larger agencies the SEC said “the procedures for disseminating a pending rating action appeared to allow for limited dissemination of a pending rating action in some instances prior to public dissemination.” While they didnt name the agency there has been much speculation that Standard & Poors was the prime target of the probe.

We find this very troubling for the municipal bond ratings industry and another reason for investors to use market implied ratings which are disseminated to all investors immediately.

The 23-page document is the latest report released by the SEC on the major ratings agencies — Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s — and seven others of lesser stature which are recognized in the United States.

Annual checks of the agencies were introduced under a financial reform law that came into effect in July last year. Up until then, the checks were carried out every two years. This latest report covers the 2009-2010 period. No agencies were named throughout the report.

The powerful “big three” raters have been accused of contributing to the global financial crisis by helping propel the sale of risky investments such as mortgage-backed securities just to net more business.

The agencies, suspected of multiple conflicts of interest, are the focus of several US probes. S&P’s decision in August 2011 to strip the United States of its sterling AAA credit rating was preceded by several media reports announcing the decision was imminent.

The SEC noted that each of the big three had “made changes to improve its operations since the 2007-08 examinations.”Commission staff made a series of recommendations to each agency for improvements, notably on how to handle conflicts of interest, the report said.

Credit Raters Should Follow American ‘Idol’ Judges

Saturday, September 3rd, 2011

“American Idol” is the most watched television show ever. Steven Tyler and the other judges do a fine job rating contestants. But the judging skills of the big 3 credit raters have failed the US Investing public. And now the US Congress is in the process of pulling their prime time status.

Whats the lesson here for credit raters? Investors vote thru their wallets. Assets are worth what the marketplace is willing to pay… No more no less. Its common knowledge that credit ratings can be easily derived from asset prices by using market implied credit ratings. These ratings are in place for all municipal bonds at bondview.

The even prescient Bart Chilton, commissioner on the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission has some good comments about all this.

On Aug. 5, the Standard and Poor’s rating agency downgraded the United States from AAA to AA+. That news ran across front pages. Since the early 1900s, when ratings began, this was the first time the United States wasn’t rated AAA.

S & P’s downgrade was based upon its view that Washington politics remain unstable and therefore deficit-reduction measures will not be attainable. Additionally, their decision was fueled by a $2 trillion calculation “error.” The direct impact on markets was colossal. The Monday following the release of the rating, the Dow dropped 635 points!

Remember, some of these agencies (like S & P) are the ones who got ratings so very wrong a few years ago. Not only did they give favorable ratings to firms that ultimately went under during the economic fiasco, they maintained AAA ratings on pools of junk mortgages packaged by Wall Street banks, trading away credible ratings for the bottom line of the ratings agencies. Do we really want to continue to rely upon such agencies?

Now consider “Idol” judge Steven Tyler (the flamboyant Aerosmith front man). He provides insightful commentary based upon his music and performance experience. What he says colors contestant performances with a professional texture viewers might not otherwise notice. What he and the other judges do not do is render the final judgment. That’s up to the viewers.

Ratings agencies need to be more like “Idol”: providing information, but not making final judgments that drastically influence outcomes. They should be more informative and insightful, but not deterministic. They’ve become excessively powerful and create a self-fulfilling prophesy about what markets will do. As one member of Congress asked the heads of the ratings agencies, “How could you possibly make that kind of a decision based on an opinion when you have millions of people relying on that?”

Furthermore, smaller ratings agencies should be encouraged to compete, rather than relying upon three agencies comprising 97 percent of all ratings. Importantly, agencies should work for consumers, not deal makers – a business model that incentivizes agencies to provide favorable ratings.

As Tyler sings, it’s time to stop “Livin’ on the Edge” of the financial teeter totter subject to faulty ratings agencies. We need to change the way the raters operate. We have seen the damage they can create and we should accept the status quo “No more, no more.”

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Cleaning Up the Muni Market

Sunday, August 7th, 2011

Two well professors are proposing that states and localities create a national nonprofit institution that would provide issuers with independent advice on bond financings, help them disclose standardized information and take other steps to improve liquidity in the muni market. Professor Andrew Ang from Columbia University and Richard Greene from Carnegie Mellon says an independent, non-profit advisory organization for municipalities could increase transparency and liquidity in the muni bond market, sweeping billions of dollars back to taxpayers and investors. Economists and taxpayers, safe to say, always share at least one perspective: they hate to see inefficient markets because that means money is going to waste. Municipal bond markets are highly inefficient and could benefit from a good clean up to turn billions of dollars in back to investors and municipalities — and by extension, to taxpayers.

The value that is being siphoned away through the muni market, Professor Andrew Ang says, can be attributed to two flaws: the market is both highly illiquid and very opaque, costing investors and municipalities billions of dollars every year.

When states, cities, and other municipalities issue bonds to raise money for public projects, they depend on intermediary brokers to match them with buyers. These buyers face difficulties in selling these bonds if they require their invested capital back early because secondary markets are illiquid and trading costs are extremely high. Furthermore, no standard system exists to get timely, accurate information about the roughly 1.5 million bond issues on the market, or the financial condition of any of the 50,000-plus institutions that issue municipal bonds.

In practical terms, then, it’s difficult to meaningfully compare bond prices and other important market information valuable to buyers and sellers. “In any type of market where you have illiquidity and poor information, bad things happen,” Ang says. “In the muni market, that means unnecessary costs in the forms of interest expense, fees from brokers, and other transaction costs for investors and issuers.”

Ang worked with fellow economist Richard Green of Carnegie Mellon to develop a proposal for redirecting billions back to public coffers and investors. First, they documented the severe illiquidity and transactions costs in the municipal market and the lack of timely and useful information available to investors. Researchers estimate the annual amount that investors overpay combined with what municipalities are losing to administration and transaction costs at around $30 billion per year — interest costs to municipalities would be more than 1 percent lower if muni markets had the same liquidity as US Treasury bonds.

The solution proposed by Ang and Green could recoup many unnecessary costs associated with the muni market as it is currently organized, by creating an independent, nonprofit organization — CommonMuni — to advise issuers and provide better information to all players in the market.

CommonMuni would advise cities and states on best practices, for example, how to avoid refinancing that incurs long-term losses, or reduce costs associated with bond issues, or how and when to use derivatives with bond issues. Its other important activities, particularly early on, aim to increase transparency, since this would improve the quality and amount of information available to buyers and sellers, thereby improving liquidity.

Most importantly, CommonMuni could provide independent, high quality advice backed by its large resources to municipal issuers that would be prohibitively costly, or difficult to access, for individual municipalities to access on their own. Better structuring of municipal issues and lower issuance costs mean substantial savings to taxpayers.

CommonMuni would encourage the creation of simple bond issues, discouraging clients from structuring bond issues in overly complex ways and encouraging standardization. This would make it much easier for investors to compare bond features and prices, in turn facilitating buying and selling. Increased standardization could allow CommonMuni to pool small bond issues into larger pools, which would give smaller municipalities stronger footing in the market by broadening their potential market of buyers.

CommonMuni would help municipalities standardize, collect, and distribute financial reports, another activity aimed at improving information and transparency. CommonMuni can encourage the creation of centralized exchanges where muni bonds could be bought and sold, which would allow investors to cut out intermediaries, reducing costs.

In proposing CommonMuni, Ang and Green took many cues from the CommonFund, an investment advising nonprofit that was founded in 1971 by the Ford Foundation to help originally fewer than one hundred — now thousands — of colleges and universities pool endowment funds and obtain investment advice. The CommonFund has helped these schools dramatically reduce the costs of administering their investment programs, grow endowments, and increase endowment contributions to offset operating expenses.

Ang and Green estimate $25 million would be required to start CommonMuni. That is less than 1/10th of 1 percent of the total projected annual savings they estimate would be generated by the project. “There are few places where states and municipalities can find billions of dollars per year for effectively nothing, especially in this environment,” Ang notes.

By attracting private grant money to fund start-up costs, CommonMuni would minimize conflicts of interest that could arise with a city-, state-, or intermediary-funded effort. It would start small, offering basic services to a modest initial client base, adding services as it attracts more clients. In the beginning, some municipal officials might be reluctant to move to CommonMuni, if only out of simple resistance to change. But, once CommonMuni starts to become successful, by lowering the borrowing costs of its founding members, other municipalities will be drawn in further improving liquidity and information for all investors and issuers.

Retail investors should welcome CommonMuni as they are able to transact at better prices in more liquid markets. However, broker-dealers and financial intermediaries may lose money in a more transparent and liquid muni market, but in the long term, they would be fine, says Ang. “We once didn’t have very good disclosure for public companies. But the New Deal improved disclosure, and now everyone is better off.”

“CommonMuni is common sense, but there are a lot of players in this market who have a vested interest in the status quo and don’t want things to change,” Ang says. “But that money need not go to financial intermediaries; it belongs to taxpayers and investors.”

Miami Could Have A Higher Credit Rating Than The USA

Tuesday, April 26th, 2011

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services downgraded refunded municipal bonds that were rated AAA in a follow-up to its downgrade notice of the U.S. triple-A outlook to negative from stable.

S&P suggests that in a scenario of economic or political stress a local government could have a higher credit rating than the USA. So could Miami one day have a higher credit rating than the USA? Sounds like a stretch.

Interestingly, S&P said it does not tie ratings on state and local governments to that of the United States and as a result, existing outlooks on their triple-A ratings will not change because of the revision for the federal government.

But this seems inconsistent with the market realty. The entire muni bond industry estimates prices based on various factors. The spread to the US treasury is a main criteria. BondView research So are Pre Refunded muni bonds since they are a key benchmark and are backed by US treasuries. Common sense suggests there will most certainly be a price and yield effect on the benchmark Pre Refunded muni bond since they are priced at a spread to the AAA US tres bond.

If and when the AAA US Tres is downgraded, so will Pre-Re muni bonds backed by US treasuries also known. But thats just the effect on the top of the food chain. We would expect to see a wild ride for all other muni bonds since they are also priced relative to the AAA US treasury bond. But to make matters worse, about 1/2 of all muni bonds are not rated by a major credit rating agency. These unrated muni bonds will be in worse limbo then they are today.

What S&P actually said was that only about 4 percent of state and local issues are rated AAA with a stable outlook by S&P, which said the possibility exists that a state or local government could have a higher rating than their sovereign government “in a scenario of economic or political stress.” But its a stretch to suggest that say swinging Miami, Florida could have a higher credit rating than the US government, long considered the global benchmark for stability.

To see the real effect of interest rate changes on muni bond prices, go to bondview.com, a free resource for muni bond investors.

Japan To Kick Out Ratings Agencies

Wednesday, August 11th, 2010

Japan’s has begun   severing  the global vice  grip of  the 3 major  credit raters. Make no mistake,  the  ”Keystone Cops” ( Moodys, S&P and Fitch)  once  powerful influence over nations, corporations and individual investors is coming to a major fork in the road.

Japan’s  effort to pull the rug out from beneath the credit raters appears to be a result of nations defending their  economies. The  credit raters are being  taken down a few notches as Japan basically kicks them out of te country by  enacting their own financial regulations that “are too risky to comply with”.  The same thing happened here in the  US when  the  FINREG bill signed into law in July 2010  caused  a complete standstill for new bond issuance. The new law regards bond-ratings firms as “experts” and holds them liable for the quality of their ratings (imagine that?) The ratings agencies’ refusal to stand behind their own ratings shut down the $1.4 trillion market for asset-backed securities for the past few days.

The credit  raters are their own worst enemy. These  Big 3 have lost  credibility due to conflicts of interest in how they run their own business, stale ratings, wrong ratings (ie,  Lehman has a solid rating months before they imploded. Surely if there opinions/predictions turned out to be accurate they wouldnt be in this mess.

And now the  credit raters are fielding their own set of   operational problems:  lower revenues, nations circling the wagons to break the monopolistic choke  hold , hundreds of lawsuits from investors, corporations and   sovereign states.

And to add to the lunacy,  In August 2010,  Moodys discussed   downgrading the USA’s  debt  the same week that   S&P  assigned Moodys  a ” BBB”  rating  (Now thats funny!) saying their rating reflects  litigation risk for  Moody’s due to    the recently passed financial reform legislation, which could lower the bar for investors to file securities fraud cases against ratings agencies. This is already happening for all credit raters.

Lets just say that the credit rating business is undergoing ground shifting changes that will result in a free and open competitive marketplace for ratings rather than a government sanctioned monopoly.

Good Luck to All

Moodys, et.al. Goes On Strike

Friday, July 23rd, 2010

The FINREG bill signed into law this week is already creating economic casualties and a complete standstill for new bond issuance.

The problem: The main credit raters, ( Moody’s , S&P and Fitch ) said the new strict FINREG standard creates too much risk for them so they went on strike. The new law regards bond-ratings firms as “experts” and holds them liable for the quality of their ratings (imagine that?) The ratings agencies’ refusal to stand behind their own ratings shut down the $1.4 trillion market for asset-backed securities for the past few days.

Basically the credit raters played chicken against the SEC by withholding permission to use ratings on new bond issues. The problem is that big parts of the bond markets — notably the asset-backed securities — require a rating by law. Late yesterday, the SEC blinked and gave a 6 month delay to the rule.

On the ratings business there are 2 issues to balance: 1) The benefits to the marketplace of a ratings TRI-opoly protected by a government sanctioned liability shield who in return should provide objective, accurate and up to date risk assessment. VERSES 2) A free and open ratings marketplace that holds raters accountable for their expert opinions.

The larger issue is this how the government will deal with the unintended consequences of 2300 pages of Dodd-Frank? How can small business owners know which laws will be not be enforced? Will there be a list? Without a list of which laws will not be enforced, how will small business owners know if it is safe to hire employees?

What do you think?

Legal Fights Over Credit Ratings-Firm Liability Rule

Friday, June 18th, 2010

Credit raters judge risk & value and were given special limited liability privileges because investors and markets crave their expert opinions. Ideally they provide an objective baseline for consistent rating when buying stocks, muni bonds and even collectables – like coins (PCGS) or even guitars. But Moodys and S&P abused their positions at precisely the wrong time – when bond investors needed them most.

So now what? Can the marketplace innovate by encouraging bond buyers to conduct their own research or think creatively about outsourcing that job, instead of reflexively relying on S.& P., Moody’s and Fitch? Are investors willing and able to become more knowledgeable about what, what and why they buy & sell? Hopefully yes, since it will make us all better investors.

The bottom line is that the credit rating industry must be deregulated into a blended solution of legacy and non regulated ratings firms. History clearly shows that markets have the intelligence to predict bad news thru market price based rating systems. For example, to see Market Ratings for any muni bond today go to http://www.bondview.com/marketratings a free analysis tools. 

Good Luck

Jim Walker
www.BondView.com

Bond Early Warning System Needed for Monitoring Defaults

Wednesday, June 16th, 2010

How can investment advisors monitor the 1.5 million cusips from 60,000 different issuers if most bonds ratings are stale or are not rated at all? We need an Bond early warning system to identify defaults before they happen. (BWACS)

Here is the latest bond default….Facilities muni bond issuer Erickson Retirement Communities, was bought by private-equity firm Redwood Capital Investments for $365 million in a 12/09 bankruptcy auction. The muni bondholders were pummeled when paid only $3.5 million of the $95 million total debt associated with Erickson’s Chicago-area Sedgebrook assisted living complex. This according to MMA’s ever prescient Matt Fabian, the top muni research firm that tracks many of the estimated 60,000 municipal bonds on the market. Matt is quoted everywhere in the press these days, including the US Congress grilling of the muni industry. His data shows that there are 23 retirement facilities-related bond issues representing about $673 million worth of debt that have missed payments and defaulted. Another $1.4 billion of retirement bonds are either making payments from reserves or are in technical default, making the sector one of the shakiest in the still relatively sedate muni marketplace. One of the Sedgebrook bonds defaulted in December, and now trades at 14 cents on the dollar, according to MMA data.

There are retirement facilities bonds, that typically are not backed up by the full faith and credit of the state/ local government. To see the actual Sedgebrook bankruptcy filing

Mitchell Savader, CEO of Savader Asset Advisors, a municipal bond-research firm in New York, says the fate of the Sedgebrook bonds doesn’t herald a widespread collapse of the unrated muni sector. However, it should prompt calls to financial advisers for bond portfolio reviews. . “to make sure that advisers and money managers are keeping an eye on their holdings.” Good advice but how can investment advisors monitor the 1.5 million cusips from 60,000 different issuers if most bonds ratings are stale or are not rated at all? We need an Bond early warning system to identify defaults before they happen. (BWACS)

Andrew Ross Sorkin, from NY Times Discusses Ratings Meltdown on Brian Lehrer show (WNYC)

Friday, June 4th, 2010

Here is a good interview with our favorite radio host, Brain Lehrer from WNYC and Andrew Ross Sorkin, columnist and financial reporter for The New York Times as they discuss the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s focus on ratings agencies in today’s hearings, featuring Warren Buffet.