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Muni Bond Talk

Archive for the ‘Market Commentary’ Category

Muni Investors Looking Good in Vallejo, CA

Saturday, May 28th, 2011

Vallejo, California, the biggest U.S. city in bankruptcy, won court permission to send its exit plan to creditors, its municipal bondholders for a vote after retired workers dropped their objections. In summary, “The plan doesn’t alter securities tied to designated revenue sources, such as about $175 million in water revenue bonds, and other special tax obligations secured by special revenue of the city’s restricted funds, according to the documents. ”

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Michael S. McManus in Sacramento, California, approved a disclosure statement for the plan in an order. McManus will take creditors’ votes into account when he decides whether to approve the plan at a hearing to be scheduled in the coming weeks. A hearing on the disclosure statement had been set for today. The retirees, represented by a court-sanctioned committee, were the last major objectors to the plan, which would cut labor costs and stretch out payments to other creditors.“The committee was concerned if the bankruptcy dragged on, their actual pensions might be jeopardized,’’ R. Dale Ginter, an attorney for the committee, said in a May 23 interview. During the bankruptcy, the city succeeded in cutting costs by firing employees, renegotiating union contracts and reducing what it pays to subsidize retiree health care. Vallejo, a onetime U.S. Navy town of about 120,000 on San Francisco Bay, sought protection from creditors in May 2008 under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, after the recession eroded tax revenue and unions rejected wage cuts. Chapter 9 allows municipalities to reorganize debt rather than liquidate. The plan doesn’t alter securities tied to designated revenue sources, such as about $175 million in water revenue bonds, and other special tax obligations secured by special revenue of the city’s restricted funds, according to the documents. The case is In re City of Vallejo, 08-26813, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of California (Sacramento).” Source: Today’s (5-27-11) Bloomberg Municipal Market Brief.

Another great American tradition is found in the millions of decisions that pass through and from our court system. We are a nation of law. We have a system that respects contracts. It carries with it the notion that obligations that are undertaken are to be fulfilled in economic terms if they are reasonable.

Vallejo’s municipal bankruptcy occurred because the politicians who ran the city ignored these fundamental values and obligated the city taxpayers to unreasonable burdens. Now the court is throwing these excessively costly burdens out. After $10 million of litigation, we are getting to some resolution. Meanwhile, please note the highlighted portion of this news report. It states that the payment stream for the essential-service revenue bond that funded the supply of water to the city is intact.

Many have emphasized importance of essential-service revenue and of the legal construction that protects these bond holders. Here is a prime example. The city is in bankruptcy, yet the bond holder is getting paid.

Reposted with permission from our friends at Cumberland Advisors.

Chicago Federal Reserve Says Dont Worry About Muni Defaults

Monday, May 2nd, 2011

There is good news and bad news from the Chicago Federal Reserve which said that 2011 will be a tough year in local government finance. Minimal growth or outright declines in property tax revenues, reduced assistance from state governments, and requirements to make larger payments to underfunded public pension funds will loom large for many local governments. However, if history is any guide, few local governments will either default on their municipal bonds or end up in bankruptcy. The aftermath of actual local government bankruptcies—such as that of Vallejo, CA, in 2008—suggest that governments are hurt badly when they emerge from bankruptcy, particularly in their ability to issue debt. And so, in all but the most dire cases, local governments under stress are likely to take alternative steps to shore up their fiscal positions.

Muni Bond Defaults Need A louder Alarm

Tuesday, December 1st, 2009

Less than a month before the $43.4 million municipal bond default of Boston based Crosstown Center , some unsuspecting retail buyer purchased $100,000 of the now defaulted bonds. Whats troubling is that this purchase was made just 18 days after a rather cryptic material event notice filed thru the EMMA.org continuing disclosure system.

While we are really thrilled to see the positive strides made by the Municipal Securities Rule Making Board and its rather lovely www.emma.org muni bond continuing disclosure system, the impact of material event notices need to be made clearer to the consumer marketplace. Sure “Material Events” can cover a wide range of topics from benign notices to the Crosstown Center disaster. Even with low muni rates, how and when is a consumer suppose to know to watch their muni bonds for falling trees? How about a rating system for these material events on a 1-10 scale from insignificant to “timber….”. After all what good is a warning bell if no one hears it?

Enough with the complaints. How about a solution? History clearly shows that markets have the intelligence to predict bad news thru market price based rating systems. Some of the larger credit rating agencies even offer these products pricing products. But the consumer market doesn’t seem educated to the benefit of these smart market priced based credit ratings. However, Bondview has built in Market Ratings along with bond pricing of muni bonds and muni rates.

Okay then how about the original rating? The defaulted bonds carried a Moody’s rating of Baa3 when issued in 2002. How is it possible to loose $43 million so fast without the rating agencies even noticing?

We can only again recommend our esteemed NY Times colleague Gretchen Morgenson’s 10/10/09 article “When Bond Ratings Get Stale”. Within this well penned piece was detailed the most colorful of quotes during congressional hearings with Scott McCleskey, head of compliance at Moody’s from April 2006 to September 2008. He outlined Moodys failure to effectively monitor the ratings on thousands of muni bonds held by individual and institutional investors. McCleskey said that “in some cases there were bonds which had been outstanding for 10 or 20 years but which had never been looked at since the original rating. In the case of the Crosstown default, its only been 7 years.

In closing, its troubling that somehow Boston is not a “party to the default”and just goes to show that muni bonds really can be a mine field. Even the smart money didn’t see that train wreck coming. Several bond funds including muni bond powerhouse Nuveen, thru its Massachusetts Premium Income Municipal Fund, held Crosstown Center bonds valued at $963,000, according to a recent securities filing. Here are BondView’s yield curves of yesterdays Industrial Development Bonds trades from Massachusetts. They dont look bad now, but a good idea to steer clear of this category if they don’t have the full faith and credit of the municipality behind them.

Special Assessment Bonds Trigger 2009 Muni Defaults

Thursday, October 15th, 2009

Muni bond defaults moved past $4 billion from January thru September 2009  driven partly by the bursting of the real estate bubble which in turn  triggered  defaults in “Special Assessment” bonds, according to the Distressed Debt Securities Newsletter and Bloomberg.

The problem is caused by builders who issued tax-exempt bonds backed by these Special Assessment bonds to finance infrastructure, such as  new schools. Builders are not paying the tax debt as houses go unsold and land  values decline. For example  in Adelanto, California, about $17 million in  bonds defaulted as school construction proceeded faster than  home building. The real estate crash caused fewer people to move into the area which means less tax revenue to support new schools. Special Assessment bonds are a real specialty area.

BondView.com can help you learn more about Special Assessment bonds…. 1) Take a look at all California Special Assessment bonds traded within the last 24 hours, see up to date yield curves for these bonds, or get an objective view of own muni bond portfolio. Or 2) For more info about Special Assessment Bonds contact an industry leader: David Taussig & Associates

(In the interests of full disclosure,  BondView is not paid for this recommendation. We are just sharing our industry contacts with you.)

Critics Complain of Bond Raters’ Conflicts at US Congress Hearings

Sunday, October 11th, 2009

Reading thru  Jeffrey R. Kosnett column from Kiplinger  ”Beyond bond ratings”, (Oct 7, 2009 )

Ten year ago , the major ratings firms ( Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s)  offered no warnings about  scandals brewing at Enron and WorldCom before the firms collapsed. More recently,  raters missed the troubles at Lehman Brothers, AIG,  and other financial institutions, not to mention subprime-mortgage securities.  Critics  complain at congressional hearings and elsewhere, that ratings agencies are “hopelessly compromised”  by a business model in which they receive fees from the very bond issuers the public expects them to judge impartially. Can muni bond holders really rely on legacy credit ratings?

Moodys Should Disclose When A Ratings Or Rerating Was Given

Sunday, October 11th, 2009

Would you want to own muni bond  that hasn’t been given a sniff test for 20 years?  Well this is a common concern for muni investors according to  the N.Y. Times  “When Bond Ratings Get Stale” (10/11/09). We were not surprised by Moody’s alleged failure to monitor older ratings on many thousands of municipal bonds held by individual and institutional investors.  Former Moodys’ senior  employee  Scott McCleskey, head of compliance at Moody’s from April 2006 to September 2008,  outlined his employer’s failures to the US Congress this week and claimed that once Moody’s issues these ratings, it rarely reviews them again — leaving them fallow, sometimes for decades, a concern echoed by other former Moody’s employees. One way to resolve this glaring problem is  for agencies to disclose exactly when a ratings or rerating was given.