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Archive for the ‘muni rates’ Category

With U.S. AAA Downgrade, Could Munis Default As Meredith Predicted?

Sunday, August 7th, 2011

The tax-free municipal bond market looks vastly different as we head toward the end of the second quarter of 2011 than it did when we were in the middle of the Meredith Whitney-led meltdown in January of this year.

In January the muni market was battered by the continued onslaught of municipal bond fund redemptions. Most of this damage occurred after Ms. Whitney’s appearance on 60 Minutes in December, when she forecast “hundreds of billions” of municipal defaults in 2011. This started the unmitigated selling, which peaked at over $4 billion per week in January. Because bond fund selling was mostly long-maturity bonds (and the funds own higher-yielding, longer-term bonds to pay their dividends), municipal bond yields soared, with long-term yields reaching 5.15% in the AAA range and between 5.5 and 6% on many high-grade revenue bonds. The bid side was often nonexistent, and liquidity was very spotty.

As Cumberland readers know, the signs were very evident that this was liquidity-driven, not credit-driven. Among these signs was the opposite movement of FALLING yields in the Build America Bonds taxable market, on the very same credits whose yields were being driven higher in the tax-free market. This was because pension funds, foreigners, and other taxable buyers were embracing the municipal credit that the retail investor was rejecting. The other sign was the fact that shorter-term yields had moved very little in the tax-free municipal market – if a true credit event had taken place, yields across the whole maturity spectrum would have moved up sharply.

As we hit the halfway point of the year, we see that 30-year AAA tax-free yields have fallen from 5.11% to 4.37% (source: Bloomberg), a drop of 75 basis points; and 10-year AAA yields have fallen from 3.47% to 2.63%, a drop of 84 basis points. Now, of course, there have been movements in Treasury yields, as well as market concern of a possible slowing economy, that have sent those yields down.

It is important to remember that this is AAA scale. Many high-grade bonds in the A and AA categories traded MUCH cheaper in January. But it is useful to look at the relative value of Treasuries and Munis from January to now. The biggest improvement in ratios was in the 10-year range. But because of the longer duration of 30-year bonds, the biggest improvement in price was in the longer end of the market.

The reasons behind this lie in the fact that most of the damage was in the long-maturity end of the market, since this was where most of the bond fund selling was concentrated. This is the area which could cure the most. Also, new-issue municipals this year are substantially reduced. Part of this was the “move up” of municipal supply at year-end from what would have been early-2011 issuance. This, of course, helped start the downdraft in the muni market in November, as issuers wanted to beat the expiration of the Build America Bonds program. Also, many state and local governments that had flexibility did not issue bonds at the nominally high yields that persisted early this year. We expect the first half of this year to close with approximately $110 billion in issuance. We expect the current lower rates will induce MORE supply in the second half of this year, but 2011 will most likely end up close to $250 billion – a marked decline from recent years.

The overall improvement in municipal finances has also contributed to improvement in the market. State and local governments (in total) are heading toward the sixth quarter in a row of RISING tax receipts. Also, problems in the pension area, which have gotten widespread press coverage, have started to be addressed. We expect this trend to continue.

The selling has abated in the municipal fund arena. Though most weeks have seen outflows, they are much smaller, and there were actually inflows a couple of weeks. Part of this is just the normal abatement of pressures, but it is also the recognition, even among retail investors, that things had really reached a point where the market was severely oversold.

The stock market, after turning in a very good performance through April of this year, has turned jittery with the Dow Jones shedding almost 900 points since the start of May. This has caused somewhat of a re-assessment of the needs of fixed income in overall investment portfolios. Presumably some of the fund selling went into equities and, depending on the timing, these assets could have been whipsawed.

We are now in the middle of a large reinvestment period where approximately $100 billion is rolling off through a mixture of coupon payments, maturing bonds, and called bonds. With fund selling reduced and some wariness in the stock market, we expect a lot of this money to now be reinvested in the bond market.

We realize that, while the municipal market is still cheap on a relative basis in the very short end and in the long end, the “giveaway market” of January and February has certainly turned around. This is causing us to be more cautious from a maturity and duration standpoint as we manage portfolios.

Reprinted with permission from our friends at Cumberland Advisors

Miami Could Have A Higher Credit Rating Than The USA

Tuesday, April 26th, 2011

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services downgraded refunded municipal bonds that were rated AAA in a follow-up to its downgrade notice of the U.S. triple-A outlook to negative from stable.

S&P suggests that in a scenario of economic or political stress a local government could have a higher credit rating than the USA. So could Miami one day have a higher credit rating than the USA? Sounds like a stretch.

Interestingly, S&P said it does not tie ratings on state and local governments to that of the United States and as a result, existing outlooks on their triple-A ratings will not change because of the revision for the federal government.

But this seems inconsistent with the market realty. The entire muni bond industry estimates prices based on various factors. The spread to the US treasury is a main criteria. BondView research So are Pre Refunded muni bonds since they are a key benchmark and are backed by US treasuries. Common sense suggests there will most certainly be a price and yield effect on the benchmark Pre Refunded muni bond since they are priced at a spread to the AAA US tres bond.

If and when the AAA US Tres is downgraded, so will Pre-Re muni bonds backed by US treasuries also known. But thats just the effect on the top of the food chain. We would expect to see a wild ride for all other muni bonds since they are also priced relative to the AAA US treasury bond. But to make matters worse, about 1/2 of all muni bonds are not rated by a major credit rating agency. These unrated muni bonds will be in worse limbo then they are today.

What S&P actually said was that only about 4 percent of state and local issues are rated AAA with a stable outlook by S&P, which said the possibility exists that a state or local government could have a higher rating than their sovereign government “in a scenario of economic or political stress.” But its a stretch to suggest that say swinging Miami, Florida could have a higher credit rating than the US government, long considered the global benchmark for stability.

To see the real effect of interest rate changes on muni bond prices, go to bondview.com, a free resource for muni bond investors.

Muni Default Risk To Get Worse Before It Gets Better

Sunday, February 21st, 2010

Take a look at this WSJ video with Bob DiMella, manager of the Mainstay Tax Free Fund. In summary he says:

1) Muni Bond Demand Increasing – Demand for muni bonds is not going away any time soon because of coming higher taxes and taxable Build America Bonds (BABs) reducing the amount of new tax free bonds being issued. BABs are also finding their way into individuals 401k plans.

2) Muni Default Risk – The problem and solution are political meaning that problems have to be perceived as being so bad that politicians have the necessary cover to make difficult changes to balance the budget, such as reducing platinum pension and health plan benefits. Sounds like a GM bankruptcy coming to a town near you.

We believe Bob DiMella’s comments are largely on track. That said, there are clearly fundamental credit problems in poorly run municipalities (i See Bondview BLOG on this ) on Harrisburg, PA.

Plus there are larger recessionary forces at play that can break the camels back. The worst recession since the 1930s has caused the steepest decline in state tax receipts on record. As a result, even after making very deep cuts, states continue to face large budget gap according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities Jan 2010 report “Recession Continues to Batter State Budgets; State Responses Could Slow Recovery “

Harrisburg Bonds May Incinerate Value ( 41473EFH9 )

Thursday, February 18th, 2010

Buffet says ” when the tide goes out, you get to see who is swimming naked”.

Harrisburg bonds (41473EFH9) are a mess due to what appears to be wasteful spending. Is this representative of a nationwide muni default? In a word NO. So what happened in Harrisburg?

According to our sources, the Harrisburg incinerator that will likely burn bondholders was an mechanical engineering boondoggle dating back to its inception and went through several refits in an attempt to get it functioning to meet environmental standards. But by then it had acquired so much debt, it could not possibly cover its costs. So now the city and Dauphin County are on the hook for what amounts to about $10k per citizen!

Here is the list of this bond’s trades.

It hasnt traded Nov 2008. The lack of interest in trading this bear is no surprise since the Harrisburg municipality filed a July 2009 material events notice .

The former Mayor Reed – king of the city for 24 years may have tried to make the city a better place to live but the spending went far out of control. He spent tens of millions building the “national” civil war museum even thought Gettysburg is just a 45 minute drive from Harrisburg with it’s own museum run by the national park system. When it was obviously not performing, the Mayor argued it was because the city needed a critical mass of museums before it could be a success. So he planned 5 more including a wild west themed museum! He spent tens of millions on acquiring artifacts, the purchase of which he allegedly personally handled. When finally forced to sell these, the city got less than 20 cents on the dollar. Turns out he’s quite the history buff and many of the artifacts allegedly decorated his office while awaiting the building of the museums. Gee if a small business owner did that an IRS agent would have a field day. But since it was public monies that were spent, no crime but certainly a foul.

This is a case of public spending gone crazy. Where were the auditors? Lumped on top of this self created mess is the local government cant afford to continue to platinum healthcare & pension benefits to police, fire and teachers. In good times, fat pensions stress cities’ finances and increase our taxes. But In bad times , these debts break the camels back .

Good media sources on this topic include the excellent WSJ article “ Muni Threat: Cities Weigh Chapter 9 (2/18/10) Harrisburg Authority, city miss debt payment; Dauphin County pays”

Thats said, the Harrisburg bond problem doesnt seem representative of a nationwide muni default. With muni rates still low, the problem is a sick facility pushed over the edge due to unique bad economic times. What is interesting is cities may well choose, or be forced to use Chapter 9 causing sweet-hart city employee union contracts to be squeezed followed by layoffs. But bondholders will suffer too. Interest payments may be frozen, effected bonds prices will drop 50%+ and when the dust settles, private equity players will swoop in and buy the distressed assets on the cheap. Bahhh and good luck to all

Muni Bond Defaults Need A louder Alarm

Tuesday, December 1st, 2009

Less than a month before the $43.4 million municipal bond default of Boston based Crosstown Center , some unsuspecting retail buyer purchased $100,000 of the now defaulted bonds. Whats troubling is that this purchase was made just 18 days after a rather cryptic material event notice filed thru the EMMA.org continuing disclosure system.

While we are really thrilled to see the positive strides made by the Municipal Securities Rule Making Board and its rather lovely www.emma.org muni bond continuing disclosure system, the impact of material event notices need to be made clearer to the consumer marketplace. Sure “Material Events” can cover a wide range of topics from benign notices to the Crosstown Center disaster. Even with low muni rates, how and when is a consumer suppose to know to watch their muni bonds for falling trees? How about a rating system for these material events on a 1-10 scale from insignificant to “timber….”. After all what good is a warning bell if no one hears it?

Enough with the complaints. How about a solution? History clearly shows that markets have the intelligence to predict bad news thru market price based rating systems. Some of the larger credit rating agencies even offer these products pricing products. But the consumer market doesn’t seem educated to the benefit of these smart market priced based credit ratings. However, Bondview has built in Market Ratings along with bond pricing of muni bonds and muni rates.

Okay then how about the original rating? The defaulted bonds carried a Moody’s rating of Baa3 when issued in 2002. How is it possible to loose $43 million so fast without the rating agencies even noticing?

We can only again recommend our esteemed NY Times colleague Gretchen Morgenson’s 10/10/09 article “When Bond Ratings Get Stale”. Within this well penned piece was detailed the most colorful of quotes during congressional hearings with Scott McCleskey, head of compliance at Moody’s from April 2006 to September 2008. He outlined Moodys failure to effectively monitor the ratings on thousands of muni bonds held by individual and institutional investors. McCleskey said that “in some cases there were bonds which had been outstanding for 10 or 20 years but which had never been looked at since the original rating. In the case of the Crosstown default, its only been 7 years.

In closing, its troubling that somehow Boston is not a “party to the default”and just goes to show that muni bonds really can be a mine field. Even the smart money didn’t see that train wreck coming. Several bond funds including muni bond powerhouse Nuveen, thru its Massachusetts Premium Income Municipal Fund, held Crosstown Center bonds valued at $963,000, according to a recent securities filing. Here are BondView’s yield curves of yesterdays Industrial Development Bonds trades from Massachusetts. They dont look bad now, but a good idea to steer clear of this category if they don’t have the full faith and credit of the municipality behind them.

AMBAC Lives Another Day

Saturday, November 21st, 2009

It seems for now that AMBAC may win its fight to survive, unless a few muni defaults of AMBAC insured bonds bankrupts them. The insurer can at least rely on the long term premiums continued to be paid by all the municipalities it did insure thereby assuring them an annual maintenance stream. All that said, the insurance industry thrives on conservative stability. So why the AMBAC roller-coaster? Well muni rates are low, but their 3rd quarter results showed a capital gain and a higher stock price moved ( over 30% to $1.30). Then last week AMBAC announced the possibility of a bankruptcy filing. And a few days later it reported $856M of surplus easing concerns the bond insurer would fall short of statutory minimums. How all this can happen in two weeks seems anything but predictable. Some Wall Street analysts had speculated the insurer would come up short of $2 million in minimum capital needed under rules set up by its regulator. Then Ambac said it will receive a gain and plus the US government is bailing them out (and alot of other companies) with a $440 million tax refund because of recent legislation that will allow it to carry back 2008 and 2009 losses as far back as 2004.

Here is a list of recently traded insured bonds from BondView.com

AMBAC Bites The Dust…?

Wednesday, November 11th, 2009

About 10 years ago my muni bond broker said the “day insurers of muni bonds cant pay off a defaulted bond you will have bigger problems on your hands” , implying such an event would never happen. Well he was right about big problems.  Bond insurers sent shudders through the $2.8 trillion municipal bond market when the threat to their internal triple-A credit ratings surfaced two years ago. But now that one of the biggest, Ambac, has said it may actually tip into bankruptcy, the market  barely cares.  With muni rates at all time lows, and bond pricing all over the place, bond insurance is a laughable notion. Up until  a few years ago any old municipality could buy a AAA bond rating bond insruance  helped  foster an environment where the AAA muni was  a commodity that was  easily traded. Many investors didnt care about the all important underlying rating of a muni and instead bought by issuing insured bonds. The underlying rating was meaningless since buyers thought they just wanted a commodity: The AAA Bond. We know now that  was a mistake, hopefully never to be repeated.

In the heyday of bond insurance, seven firms carried the top credit rating of triple-A, and half of new municipal bonds carried insurance. Now, barely 10% of new muni bonds have insurance. None have retained triple-A ratings and all but one, Assured,  have junk ratings! Their downfall came after the top insurers branched out to guarantee complex mortgage securities. When the housing market tanked, insurers saw their losses grow, their ratings fall and their clients flee.

What does this mean for today?  The muni bond market has largely taken its losses and has withstood the turmoil seen with the weakest of the insurers. Besides Ambac,  MBIA  posted its fifth straight quarterly loss earlier this year and its public finance insurance spinoff  is being challenged by banks, which say such a split is fraudulent.  Here is a list of  today’s insured bonds  trading info from BondView