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Archive for the ‘municipal bond defaults’ Category

Municipal Bankruptcies: Were Not Going To Take It Anymore

Friday, November 18th, 2011

Assured Guaranty Ltd., the only active municipal bond insurer, said it will reconsider guaranteeing public bonds in states without procedures for reviewing and approving local bankruptcy petitions. “Local governments must recognize their responsibilities to live up to the promises made by current and former duly elected officials,’’ Assured Chief Executive Officer Dominic Frederico said on a conference call with investors and analysts. “The term full faith and credit must have meaning and challenges via bankruptcy or other legal maneuvers to negotiated contracts can’t be accepted.’’ Assured backed $731.8 million of debt sold by Jefferson County, and guaranteed or reinsured debt sold as part of an incinerator expansion in Harrisburg, Frederico said the guarantor was “disappointed’’ with Jefferson County commissioners’ decision to file for bankruptcy after a tentative deal struck in September that would have cut the amount owed on debt tied to the county’s sewer system failed. He blamed “local politics’’ in Harrisburg for impeding “practical and fair solutions’’ to the city’s financial problems.”

“New Jersey won’t approve Chapter 9 bankruptcy filings by distressed municipalities, according to Thomas Neff, director of the state Division of Local Government Services. New Jersey law requires state approval of all municipal bankruptcies, Neff said in an interview at a conference of mayors in Atlantic City. His division would look to use state aid and possible takeovers of city finances to avert such filings, he said. “It’s more likely to snow in July than for us to approve a bankruptcy,’’ Neff said. “I can’t even see myself posting it for consideration.’’

Many readers have asked for a perspective on the Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy of Jefferson County, Alabama. Others have e-mailed us concerning Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Over the course of the year we have written about these situations. Our view remains that these are one-off events brought about by failures of the local political systems and disappointing governance. Sometimes corruption is added to that toxic combination.

We argue that most Munis are mostly safe most of the time. The key is to research them and understand the construction of each of these idiosyncratic credits.

Specific bankruptcies, like Jeffco and Harrisburg, are the final actions of a process that began several years previously. They were the result of poor decision making on the part of elected public officials. However, not every bad Muni deal ends in a bankruptcy. Many can be worked out. In those cases the political officials realize that avoidance of bankruptcy is “less worse” than choosing what appears politically to be an easy way out; they are mistakes that were made either by the elected officials or others involved in the process.

Portions reprinted from our friends at Cumberland Advisors

Jefferson County Finally Declares Bankruptcy

Sunday, November 13th, 2011

Jefferson County, Alabama commissioners voted by 4-1 to file bankruptcy. It will be the largest Chapter 9 bankruptcy in the United States and affects over $3 billion in municipal bonds. The process will start with hearings soon. We have written about the ongoing turmoil in Jefferson County in the past. Is this a surprise? Absolutely not.

The municipal bond market has been expecting this for some time. For the past three years this situation has been deteriorating. Its roots involve a sewer system grossly expanded under federal mandate, and corruption among county officials. It also involves the downgrade of municipal bond insurers in 2008, which caused the county’s many ill-advised swaps to skyrocket in interest costs.

Through much of the summer and fall, Jefferson County has been trying, to no avail, to negotiate a haircut on the principal of their bonds. With $3 billion involved, there will be some effects, mainly on lower-rated debt, but the market has been prepared for this. Most market participants were hoping that something could be worked out. The Governor of Alabama, Robert Bentley, had been trying to forge a solution between bondholders and the county. This solution would have included bonds backed by the state, but would also have resulted in much higher sewer fees in the county. The bankruptcy action may be an impetus toward crafting a solution.

Where have Jefferson County bonds been trading?

We expect to see little market impact on trading in Jefferson County bonds. The county has refunded most of its fixed-rate sewer debt with VRDBs and ARS in 2002 and 2003. The trades we have seen and local dealer quotes have been at high interest-rate levels. Participants most affected are the Letter of Credit banks that hold the failed remarketed debt and bond insurers, not bondholders. And with the Chapter 9 filing, we would expect to see more trading in the bonds.

What does Jefferson County do next?

They need to demonstrate to the bankruptcy judge that they cannot pay their bills. The judge will then determine what obligations they must fulfill, and at what level. JPMorgan, as well as the bond insurers FGIC and Syncora (formerly XLCA), face the largest losses.

Does this morph into a Meredith Whitney-like falloff?

We think not. Jefferson County has been developing for over three years. This is a result that almost happened in September. It was staved off by tentative settlements with creditors that did not get legislative approvals. Municipal bankruptcies are running at about 30% of last year’s totals. Problems such as Harrisburg, PA and Central Falls, RI have been known for a while; they represent specific mismanagement. Furthermore, the improvement in municipal credit this year has been very good.

Through the courtesy of our friends at Raymond James, we show two graphs:

State Taxes Grow

Property Tax Weakness

The first shows year-over-year changes in state and local taxes. The other shows specific tax revenue changes. You can see the strong rebound in state taxes, which are now back to pre-financial-crisis levels after seven quarters of gains (following five quarters of declines). Growth in local taxes – specifically property taxes – has been falling but held up better than other types of taxes when the recession hit, as it does in most recessions. The overall municipal market has rebounded smartly in the past nine months.

We will stay abreast of the next developments.

Jefferson County, Take The Money And Run

Wednesday, November 9th, 2011

Legislators in Alabama’s Jefferson County on Wednesday voted 4 to 1 to file for bankruptcy court protection and thereby put in motion what could be the biggest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history. We hope the state will quickly step in to take over the negotiation – similar to what other state governments (ie, Harrisburg, PA) have done when local officials act like children. The headline risk on events like this can cause the fragile muni bond market to quickly deteriorate.

The right thing to do is for bondholders and the county to work this out. The wrong thing to do is for the county commissioners to in effect to approve a “walk out”. To imply the entire county has no assets to sell off now or in the future is plain silly. How about selling off or privatizing local government assets like city hall, office buildings, vacant land? Or what about securitizing future revenues from parking garage revenue and sales taxes?

There is plenty of time to make annual payouts over the next 30 years. As the economy improves so will Jefferson Country. But to just take the money and run is just plain wrong. Oh and by the way, its illegal.

“I am disappointed by the commission’s decision… as bankruptcy will negatively impact not only the Birmingham region, but also the entire state,” Gov. Robert Bentley said in a statement moments after the County Commission voted. “By filing for bankruptcy, the county commission now relinquishes control of its affairs into the hands of a federal bankruptcy judge,” Bentley said.

Despite a tentative deal with creditors reached in September to settle $3.14 billion of debt, county commissioners this week resurrected the threat of a Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing largely because the estimated savings from the September agreement had shrunk by about $140 million. The filing could add to heightened concerns in the $3.7 trillion U.S. municipal bond market, which has recently been hit hard by the high-profile debt crisis in Pennsylvania’s capital of Harrisburg. Creditors such as JPMorgan Chase & Co and the county in September reached a tentative deal calling for Jefferson County’s sewer-system debt to be substantially reduced, but final terms were not reached.

A sticking point discussed in a commissioners’ meeting on Monday was adjustment of a $140 million difference between the originally agreed-upon $2.05 billion the county must repay the creditors. That figure recently crept up to $2.19 billion. The September agreement was seen as a turning point for Jefferson County, which since 2008 has teetered on the edge of a bankruptcy that would have surpassed that filed by Orange County, California, in 1994. Jefferson County’s debt escalated in the mid-2000s with interest and auction rate bond deals as it sought to refinance an upgrade of its sewer system. Should Jefferson file Chapter 9 bankruptcy, at over $5 billion for the county’s total indebtedness, it will be the largest municipal filing in U.S. history.

Harrisburg, The Saga Continues

Wednesday, October 26th, 2011

Reports from Bloomberg were that Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett and the Harrisburg City Council are in a standoff resulting from Harrisburg’s filing of Chapter 9 bankruptcy last week. The governor is looking to overrule the city council’s action and have the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania take over the finances of the city.

The story – often reported by our friends at Cumberland Advisors – is that of an incinerator that was not needed, but built as a boondoggle. After failing to attract enough business, the city decided to spend much more money retrofitting the incinerator, putting the city’s pledge behind the bonds used to finance and retrofit. This turned into a disaster. The city stopped making payments on the incinerator debt last year. With much consternation and discussion, they have continued to pay debt service on their general-obligation bonds.

Last week the city council voted to declare Chapter 9 bankruptcy for Harrisburg, even though the Mayor of Harrisburg was against it and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania itself had passed a law declaring that it would be illegal for Harrisburg to declare bankruptcy.

There is now a court-mandated delay of a month to sort this out. On Monday, a judge for the US Bankruptcy Court in Pennsylvania set a November 23 court date to settle the legality of the bankruptcy declaration by the council.

Why is the state moving as if the matter has already been settled in its favor? It’s not just the politics, it’s the state not wanting Harrisburg’s woes to result in much higher borrowing costs for towns and cities in the rest of central Pennsylvania.

What do we see reflected in the municipal bond market, given the current state of affairs?

Most of the Harrisburg general-obligation debt is insured. Ratings on Harrisburg itself have been withdrawn by the rating agencies. Bonds backed by Assured Guaranty, the healthiest of the bond insurers (AA3 Moody’s and AA+ Standard and Poor’s) are trading at 5.5% to 6%. Bonds from downgraded insurer MBIA (now National RE), rated Baa1/BBB, are trading in the 6.25-6.50% range, and bonds with other insurers who are below investment-grade and have no rating are all over the lot, with trades in the 7%-plus range (levels courtesy of Oppenheimer). This is in a world where longer-maturity, high-grade Pennsylvania debt is trading in the 4.5% range.

The one thing we know for sure is that the bond insurers come down squarely of the opinion that Harrisburg has NOT taken the necessary steps to avoid bankruptcy: raising taxes, selling assets, and using their full faith and credit to pay their bonds.

So far, this has not carried over to the state’s own bonds, as far as any patina of higher yields associated with the problems of Harrisburg. The state sold bonds this week at their normal high-grade level.

Stay tuned as this develops.

Reprinted by permission from our friends at Cumberland Advisors

Harrisburg Burns

Wednesday, October 26th, 2011

We have written about Harrisburg PA.s struggle extensively during the past two years. A small city unable to pay off a jumbo-sized debt hasn’t shaken the muni market. Despite eye-catching headlines recently over Harrisburg bankruptcy filing, the news barely fazed other muni investors and probably rightly so.

A Messy Situation

Harrisburg’s financial woes stem from an incinerator originally built in 1972. Plagued with operating problems from the start, the city nevertheless decided to expand and retrofit the plant in 2003, taking on $125 million in debt. The initial contractor on the job went belly up, which led to more borrowing and debt that mushroomed to $310 million – a daunting sum for a city of 49,000 residents and a total municipal budget of less than $60 million. Ultimately, the city filed for bankruptcy, which the state is currently challenging in court.

Bonds Are Insured

Although Harrisburg’s move was unusual, the market hardly took notice. Harrisburg is not a significant issuer of bonds, and its financial plight has been well documented. A good portion of Harrisburg’s overall debt is insured, and many of the bonds associated with the incinerator are secured by Assured Guaranty, which made some payments the city previously missed. However, Assured credit rating has been lowered several times from AAA to where it is today.

While there are other cities and municipalities face strained finances, few are confronted with challenges similar to Harrisburg’s. Defaults continue to be extremely rare. Last year, municipal defaults totaled $2.65 billion, an 8.6% decline from 2009. So far this year, defaults total $1.1 billion, a small fraction of the $2.93 trillion in outstanding municipal bonds.

In the meantime, a judge placed Harrisburg’s bankruptcy on hold for a month, enabling bond insurers to file briefs in the case while state lawmakers are pushing to take over the city’s finances. Soon after Harrisburg filed for bankruptcy, the state sued, concurring with the mayor’s opposition to the filing. Harrisburg’s City Council voted three times over the summer to reject a financial recovery plan under the state’s program for distressed communities. All the decisions were carried by a 4-3 margin. The measure on October 12th to file bankruptcy was approved by the same 4-3 margin.

Municipal Tax Revenue Grows for 7th Straight Quarter.

Sunday, October 2nd, 2011

Municipal credit revenue continues to improve. This week it was reported that US state and local government tax revenue rose almost 7% in the second quarter, from a year earlier. This marks seven quarters in a row of growth (following five quarters of decline). More importantly, tax revenue now slightly exceeds the peak of revenue set in 2008, before the financial crisis set in.

This is important on two counts. First, it blunts the Meredith Whitney arguments that led to the bond-fund sell-off last winter. But also, it reinforces the argument about the quality of municipal credits. Many state and local municipal entities enjoy captive audiences – for water, sewer, transportation, etc. They performed in this recession like they have in others, by tightening belts, cutting costs, and raising fees where necessary. And this has been a big contributor to the curing of the muni market since last winter.

The White House proposals are keeping muni rates high. The Obama administration’s Jobs Bill has proposed imposing a tax on individuals or couples above certain income thresholds, to essentially eliminate the tax advantage enjoyed between the 28% and 35% tax bracket. This 7% tax would translate into roughly a 35-basis-point tax on muni yields (4-4.5% range). We do not think there is much chance of this proposal being enacted – certainly not to include existing municipal bonds. However, the uncertainty is helping to contribute to tax-exempt bond yields which are much higher than they would be without it. In some cases, taxable BABs (Build America Bonds) yields are only marginally higher than the tax-exempt form of the very same credit. The market has started to see cross-over buyers respond to this anomaly.

As we head into the last quarter of the year we expect to see municipal supply pick up. It downshifted greatly early in the year, due to the high interest rates fostered by the Whitney meltdown. With lower nominal rates, visible supply is starting to pick up. But the December/January reinvestment period should also be vigorous – especially given the volatility of the equity market. That should mean most of the reinvestment goes back into the muni market.

And after much consternation on all sides, we do not expect the Administration proposals with regard to tax-free bonds to pass. This should also mean that the muni market will return to more normalized pricing levels relative to Treasuries.

Thanks to our friends at Cumberland Advisors.

The US Downgrade and the Muni Bonds

Wednesday, August 10th, 2011

We have fielded many questions in the last few days about what effect the downgrade of the United States debt from AAA to AA+ and the effect on the 11,000 or so municipal bonds that S&P subsequently downgraded. Investors and professionals want to know what they should do with the muin bond portfolios.

The bonds that may be effected most include Housing bonds (bonds with the backing of federal agencies like GNMA and FNMA) will see their S&P ratings affected. Certain lease bonds with the federal government as a tenant may see their ratings downgraded, depending on the proportion that the federal government is responsible for on the leases

Pre refunded and escrowed municipal bonds, the gold standard for munis: These are generally older, higher-coupon bonds that have been defeased by their issuers. Proceeds of “refunding” issues are placed in Treasury securities to pay interest and call the older bonds at the first call date. This results in significant cost savings for the municipalities, and the older bonds are often (but not always) re-rated AAA based on the US Treasuries, which are now backing the older bonds. These bonds will see a downgrade.

What does this mean from a portfolio-management sense? In our view, it should not affect the muni market greatly. In our opinion, the United States is still the premier sovereign credit in the world. Investors will continue to own prerefunded bonds in the shorter-maturity end of a barbell strategy.

It is important to remember that both Moody’s and Fitch continue to rate the US as “AAA” including housing bonds backed by the federal government or prerefunded bonds or bonds backed by federal leases. As strange as it sounds, because state and local governments and their agencies are rated on different criteria than governments, some municipal issuers will have S&P credit ratings higher than the federal government.

The smart muni bond professionals who fly in our circle are saying the municipal marketplace will still react to the same forces it has in the past: high demand for tax free bonds propping up prices due to low supply, retail buy and hold investors ignoring much of the fray, bond fund redemptions of high quality bonds causing a pricing ripple effect on on all other muni bonds and the lack of clear insight into the why and how of credit ratings.

MSRB Steps Up Its Game To Warn “Play Fair or Else”

Monday, August 8th, 2011

The MSRB took a defensive posture in the wake of the S&P’s downgrade on the USA by warning dealers that despite the potential market disruption, investor protection rules continue to apply and that all trading activity will be monitored as usual. As an example the MSRB said it would be unfair for a bond purchase by a dealer at a low price followed by a resale shortly thereafter at a considerably higher price. What effect this will have on the markets are unclear until we see the trickle down to prices as a result of S&P’s downgrade on the USA’s long term debt. Here is the release or you can read below

MSRB INFORMATION RELEASE As a result of actions and statements by certain Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations regarding the credit rating of the United States and the associated review of scurities of some states and municipalities, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) is publishing a reminder to dealers relating to the application of MSRB investor protection rules in the context of the potential impact of such ratings action on the municipal securities market.

The MSRB reminds brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers that, in spite of any market disruption that may result from such rating actions, all MSRB rules continue to apply, including rules on fair practice, trade pricing, suitability and disclosure.

MSRB ADVISES DEALERS ON CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS IN LIGHT OF POTENTIAL MUNICIPAL RATINGS ACTIONS
On August 5, 2011, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Service reduced the sovereign credit rating of the United States from “AAA” to “AA+.” On August 2, 2011, Moody’s Investors Service (“Moody’s”) confirmed its United States government bond rating at “Aaa,” although Moody’s assigned the rating a “negative outlook.” On August 2, 2011, Fitch Ratings announced that it has maintained its “AAA” U.S. sovereign debt rating but said that it continued to review the credit and expected that the review would be complete by the end of August 2011. Certain of these Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (“Rating Agencies”) have also said that the securities of some states and municipalities are under review for possible downgrade as a result of their direct or indirect links to the credit of the United States. They had previously stated that, should they take negative rating actions on the debt of the United States, they also would likely downgrade debt directly or indirectly linked to the United States sovereign rating, as well as the ratings of certain municipal issuers that either have large numbers of federal employees in their jurisdiction or that are significantly reliant on federal government funding.

Although to date the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”) has observed no unusual municipal market activity, as a result of this continuing uncertainty concerning the ratings of such states and local governments the MSRB is publishing this reminder notice relating to the application of MSRB investor protection rules in the context of the potential impact of such ratings actions on the municipal securities market.

The MSRB reminds brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) that, in spite of any market disruption that may result from such rating actions, all MSRB rules continue to apply, including rules on fair practice, trade pricing, suitability and disclosure. The MSRB is particularly concerned about the treatment of retail investors. MSRB Rule G-17 prohibits dealers from using a situation of market disruption to attempt to manipulate the pricing of municipal securities, either alone or in concert. Further, such situation does not negate a dealer’s duty under MSRB Rule G-30 (on prices and commissions) to purchase bonds from a customer or sell bonds to a customer as a principal at prices (including any markdown or markup) that are fair and reasonable based on prevailing market conditions.

As always, if the MSRB becomes aware of allegations that any dealer has attempted to take advantage of clients by trading in municipal securities at prices that are not fair and reasonable, the MSRB will notify the appropriate enforcement agencies and, if the allegations are true, recommend severe sanctions. One potential indication of such unfair behavior would be a purchase by a dealer at a low price followed by a resale shortly thereafter at a considerably higher price. While the MSRB recognizes that market disruption can present significant challenges to establishing a fair and reasonable price with precision, Rules G-17 and G-30 do not permit dealers to improperly take advantage of their clients by executing trades at prices that are not fair and reasonable. The MSRB encourages dealers that utilize computerized or other pricing models to review them carefully to determine that the prices they generate are fair and reasonable, particularly if such models were not designed to take into consideration the direct or indirect impact of a material downgrade in United States credit ratings.

The exretailistence of a market disruption also does not negate a dealer’s duty to ensure that their recommendations are consistent with their obligations under MSRB Rule G-19 (on suitability of recommendations), which can be a significant concern in the context of investors who may rely on the recommendations of their dealers during this time of uncertainty. Further, dealers are reminded that all material facts concerning a transaction known to the dealer or available from established industry sources must be disclosed to the client at or prior to the time of sale, under MSRB Rule G-17.

The MSRB will continue to monitor developments in the marketplace and any potential concerns resulting from any ratings actions.

August 8, 2011

With U.S. AAA Downgrade, Could Munis Default As Meredith Predicted?

Sunday, August 7th, 2011

The tax-free municipal bond market looks vastly different as we head toward the end of the second quarter of 2011 than it did when we were in the middle of the Meredith Whitney-led meltdown in January of this year.

In January the muni market was battered by the continued onslaught of municipal bond fund redemptions. Most of this damage occurred after Ms. Whitney’s appearance on 60 Minutes in December, when she forecast “hundreds of billions” of municipal defaults in 2011. This started the unmitigated selling, which peaked at over $4 billion per week in January. Because bond fund selling was mostly long-maturity bonds (and the funds own higher-yielding, longer-term bonds to pay their dividends), municipal bond yields soared, with long-term yields reaching 5.15% in the AAA range and between 5.5 and 6% on many high-grade revenue bonds. The bid side was often nonexistent, and liquidity was very spotty.

As Cumberland readers know, the signs were very evident that this was liquidity-driven, not credit-driven. Among these signs was the opposite movement of FALLING yields in the Build America Bonds taxable market, on the very same credits whose yields were being driven higher in the tax-free market. This was because pension funds, foreigners, and other taxable buyers were embracing the municipal credit that the retail investor was rejecting. The other sign was the fact that shorter-term yields had moved very little in the tax-free municipal market – if a true credit event had taken place, yields across the whole maturity spectrum would have moved up sharply.

As we hit the halfway point of the year, we see that 30-year AAA tax-free yields have fallen from 5.11% to 4.37% (source: Bloomberg), a drop of 75 basis points; and 10-year AAA yields have fallen from 3.47% to 2.63%, a drop of 84 basis points. Now, of course, there have been movements in Treasury yields, as well as market concern of a possible slowing economy, that have sent those yields down.

It is important to remember that this is AAA scale. Many high-grade bonds in the A and AA categories traded MUCH cheaper in January. But it is useful to look at the relative value of Treasuries and Munis from January to now. The biggest improvement in ratios was in the 10-year range. But because of the longer duration of 30-year bonds, the biggest improvement in price was in the longer end of the market.

The reasons behind this lie in the fact that most of the damage was in the long-maturity end of the market, since this was where most of the bond fund selling was concentrated. This is the area which could cure the most. Also, new-issue municipals this year are substantially reduced. Part of this was the “move up” of municipal supply at year-end from what would have been early-2011 issuance. This, of course, helped start the downdraft in the muni market in November, as issuers wanted to beat the expiration of the Build America Bonds program. Also, many state and local governments that had flexibility did not issue bonds at the nominally high yields that persisted early this year. We expect the first half of this year to close with approximately $110 billion in issuance. We expect the current lower rates will induce MORE supply in the second half of this year, but 2011 will most likely end up close to $250 billion – a marked decline from recent years.

The overall improvement in municipal finances has also contributed to improvement in the market. State and local governments (in total) are heading toward the sixth quarter in a row of RISING tax receipts. Also, problems in the pension area, which have gotten widespread press coverage, have started to be addressed. We expect this trend to continue.

The selling has abated in the municipal fund arena. Though most weeks have seen outflows, they are much smaller, and there were actually inflows a couple of weeks. Part of this is just the normal abatement of pressures, but it is also the recognition, even among retail investors, that things had really reached a point where the market was severely oversold.

The stock market, after turning in a very good performance through April of this year, has turned jittery with the Dow Jones shedding almost 900 points since the start of May. This has caused somewhat of a re-assessment of the needs of fixed income in overall investment portfolios. Presumably some of the fund selling went into equities and, depending on the timing, these assets could have been whipsawed.

We are now in the middle of a large reinvestment period where approximately $100 billion is rolling off through a mixture of coupon payments, maturing bonds, and called bonds. With fund selling reduced and some wariness in the stock market, we expect a lot of this money to now be reinvested in the bond market.

We realize that, while the municipal market is still cheap on a relative basis in the very short end and in the long end, the “giveaway market” of January and February has certainly turned around. This is causing us to be more cautious from a maturity and duration standpoint as we manage portfolios.

Reprinted with permission from our friends at Cumberland Advisors

Central Falls Turned Upside Down By Unions

Friday, August 5th, 2011

One mans’ garbage is another mans gold. The painful truth is that as muni debt increases, so do the risks that someday it will be politically, economically and financially worthwhile for borrowers to escape it. The Central Falls bondholders seem to have dodged the bullet for now. The question is when the union sue the town, will the bondholders be vulnerable to losses as pensions and health-care obligations are re-negotiated. Muni bonds are great until your local town bond issuer declares Chapter 9 like bankruptcy. Then all bets are off until the smoke clears.

To see a real live insolvent Central Falls GO bond that last traded at 58 cents on the dollar, go to bondview. For more about this situation, here is a good piece from our smart friends at the WSJ’s Op-Ed on Muni bonds, bankruptcies and unions….

On Monday the small Rhode Island town of Central Falls declared bankruptcy because its sky-high labor costs had impaired its ability to pay its bills. The ratings agencies say the development is no surprise, but we wonder whether they’ll be saying the same thing when a bigger city falls off a cliff.

Central Falls’s financial problems are not much different from many states and municipalities. Inflexible and costly collective bargaining agreements have driven up its labor costs and crowded out services. The city is running $5 million annual structural deficits on a $16 million budget. Its pension and retiree health-care bills add up to $80 million. Public safety officers contribute a mere 7% of their salaries to pensions and can retire after 20 years with pensions equal to 50% of their final year’s salary. Such a system in which employees spend more time in retirement than working is unsustainable. Greece, Q.E.D.

In the last year the state has appointed two receivers to bring the city back from the dead, but neither has been able to repeat the miracle of Lazarus. The city’s first receiver Mark Pfeiffer raised property and car taxes by more than 20%, but higher taxes merely drove residents out of town.

In February Governor Lincoln Chafee replaced Mr. Pfeiffer with retired state supreme court judge Robert Flanders. He, too, asked the unions for concessions but came up empty-handed. Mr. Flanders then shut down the city library and community center. In a last ditch effort to save the city from bankruptcy, Mr. Flanders asked retirees to accept scaled-back pensions and to contribute more to their health benefits. The retirees overwhelmingly voted no.

The bright side of Central Falls’s saga is that it’s causing Rhode Island lawmakers to double down on pension reform. As Governor Chafee said earlier this week, “This is not just a Central Falls issue, this is a state issue.” Dozens of towns in Rhode Island, including Providence, have similar pension problems. The state’s pension system, which has a $7 billion unfunded liability, is one of the worst funded in the nation.

Mr. Chafee, an independent, and the Democratic state legislature have committed to tackling pensions in the fall. State treasurer Gina Raimondo, a Democrat, recently issued a report that suggests modifying retirees’ cost-of-living adjustments, raising the retirement age and creating new hybrid pensions that include a 401(k)-style plan and a modest defined benefit. These all sound like good ideas, but the test of Democrats’ sincerity will be when the unions turn out en masse at the capitol to denounce them for betraying their party and trashing collective bargaining.