Join Today!

Muni Bond Talk

Archive for the ‘Ratings’ Category

SEC suspects leaks at ratings agencies.

Sunday, October 2nd, 2011

Strike up another body blow against the big three credit ratings agencies. The SEC said the in-house procedures of one of the world’s top three ratings agencies has been leaking its decisions in advance of public dissemination, according to a report by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

While no agencies were named in the report, at one of the larger agencies the SEC said “the procedures for disseminating a pending rating action appeared to allow for limited dissemination of a pending rating action in some instances prior to public dissemination.” While they didnt name the agency there has been much speculation that Standard & Poors was the prime target of the probe.

We find this very troubling for the municipal bond ratings industry and another reason for investors to use market implied ratings which are disseminated to all investors immediately.

The 23-page document is the latest report released by the SEC on the major ratings agencies — Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s — and seven others of lesser stature which are recognized in the United States.

Annual checks of the agencies were introduced under a financial reform law that came into effect in July last year. Up until then, the checks were carried out every two years. This latest report covers the 2009-2010 period. No agencies were named throughout the report.

The powerful “big three” raters have been accused of contributing to the global financial crisis by helping propel the sale of risky investments such as mortgage-backed securities just to net more business.

The agencies, suspected of multiple conflicts of interest, are the focus of several US probes. S&P’s decision in August 2011 to strip the United States of its sterling AAA credit rating was preceded by several media reports announcing the decision was imminent.

The SEC noted that each of the big three had “made changes to improve its operations since the 2007-08 examinations.”Commission staff made a series of recommendations to each agency for improvements, notably on how to handle conflicts of interest, the report said.

The US Downgrade and the Muni Bonds

Wednesday, August 10th, 2011

We have fielded many questions in the last few days about what effect the downgrade of the United States debt from AAA to AA+ and the effect on the 11,000 or so municipal bonds that S&P subsequently downgraded. Investors and professionals want to know what they should do with the muin bond portfolios.

The bonds that may be effected most include Housing bonds (bonds with the backing of federal agencies like GNMA and FNMA) will see their S&P ratings affected. Certain lease bonds with the federal government as a tenant may see their ratings downgraded, depending on the proportion that the federal government is responsible for on the leases

Pre refunded and escrowed municipal bonds, the gold standard for munis: These are generally older, higher-coupon bonds that have been defeased by their issuers. Proceeds of “refunding” issues are placed in Treasury securities to pay interest and call the older bonds at the first call date. This results in significant cost savings for the municipalities, and the older bonds are often (but not always) re-rated AAA based on the US Treasuries, which are now backing the older bonds. These bonds will see a downgrade.

What does this mean from a portfolio-management sense? In our view, it should not affect the muni market greatly. In our opinion, the United States is still the premier sovereign credit in the world. Investors will continue to own prerefunded bonds in the shorter-maturity end of a barbell strategy.

It is important to remember that both Moody’s and Fitch continue to rate the US as “AAA” including housing bonds backed by the federal government or prerefunded bonds or bonds backed by federal leases. As strange as it sounds, because state and local governments and their agencies are rated on different criteria than governments, some municipal issuers will have S&P credit ratings higher than the federal government.

The smart muni bond professionals who fly in our circle are saying the municipal marketplace will still react to the same forces it has in the past: high demand for tax free bonds propping up prices due to low supply, retail buy and hold investors ignoring much of the fray, bond fund redemptions of high quality bonds causing a pricing ripple effect on on all other muni bonds and the lack of clear insight into the why and how of credit ratings.

With U.S. AAA Downgrade, Could Munis Default As Meredith Predicted?

Sunday, August 7th, 2011

The tax-free municipal bond market looks vastly different as we head toward the end of the second quarter of 2011 than it did when we were in the middle of the Meredith Whitney-led meltdown in January of this year.

In January the muni market was battered by the continued onslaught of municipal bond fund redemptions. Most of this damage occurred after Ms. Whitney’s appearance on 60 Minutes in December, when she forecast “hundreds of billions” of municipal defaults in 2011. This started the unmitigated selling, which peaked at over $4 billion per week in January. Because bond fund selling was mostly long-maturity bonds (and the funds own higher-yielding, longer-term bonds to pay their dividends), municipal bond yields soared, with long-term yields reaching 5.15% in the AAA range and between 5.5 and 6% on many high-grade revenue bonds. The bid side was often nonexistent, and liquidity was very spotty.

As Cumberland readers know, the signs were very evident that this was liquidity-driven, not credit-driven. Among these signs was the opposite movement of FALLING yields in the Build America Bonds taxable market, on the very same credits whose yields were being driven higher in the tax-free market. This was because pension funds, foreigners, and other taxable buyers were embracing the municipal credit that the retail investor was rejecting. The other sign was the fact that shorter-term yields had moved very little in the tax-free municipal market – if a true credit event had taken place, yields across the whole maturity spectrum would have moved up sharply.

As we hit the halfway point of the year, we see that 30-year AAA tax-free yields have fallen from 5.11% to 4.37% (source: Bloomberg), a drop of 75 basis points; and 10-year AAA yields have fallen from 3.47% to 2.63%, a drop of 84 basis points. Now, of course, there have been movements in Treasury yields, as well as market concern of a possible slowing economy, that have sent those yields down.

It is important to remember that this is AAA scale. Many high-grade bonds in the A and AA categories traded MUCH cheaper in January. But it is useful to look at the relative value of Treasuries and Munis from January to now. The biggest improvement in ratios was in the 10-year range. But because of the longer duration of 30-year bonds, the biggest improvement in price was in the longer end of the market.

The reasons behind this lie in the fact that most of the damage was in the long-maturity end of the market, since this was where most of the bond fund selling was concentrated. This is the area which could cure the most. Also, new-issue municipals this year are substantially reduced. Part of this was the “move up” of municipal supply at year-end from what would have been early-2011 issuance. This, of course, helped start the downdraft in the muni market in November, as issuers wanted to beat the expiration of the Build America Bonds program. Also, many state and local governments that had flexibility did not issue bonds at the nominally high yields that persisted early this year. We expect the first half of this year to close with approximately $110 billion in issuance. We expect the current lower rates will induce MORE supply in the second half of this year, but 2011 will most likely end up close to $250 billion – a marked decline from recent years.

The overall improvement in municipal finances has also contributed to improvement in the market. State and local governments (in total) are heading toward the sixth quarter in a row of RISING tax receipts. Also, problems in the pension area, which have gotten widespread press coverage, have started to be addressed. We expect this trend to continue.

The selling has abated in the municipal fund arena. Though most weeks have seen outflows, they are much smaller, and there were actually inflows a couple of weeks. Part of this is just the normal abatement of pressures, but it is also the recognition, even among retail investors, that things had really reached a point where the market was severely oversold.

The stock market, after turning in a very good performance through April of this year, has turned jittery with the Dow Jones shedding almost 900 points since the start of May. This has caused somewhat of a re-assessment of the needs of fixed income in overall investment portfolios. Presumably some of the fund selling went into equities and, depending on the timing, these assets could have been whipsawed.

We are now in the middle of a large reinvestment period where approximately $100 billion is rolling off through a mixture of coupon payments, maturing bonds, and called bonds. With fund selling reduced and some wariness in the stock market, we expect a lot of this money to now be reinvested in the bond market.

We realize that, while the municipal market is still cheap on a relative basis in the very short end and in the long end, the “giveaway market” of January and February has certainly turned around. This is causing us to be more cautious from a maturity and duration standpoint as we manage portfolios.

Reprinted with permission from our friends at Cumberland Advisors

Miami Could Have A Higher Credit Rating Than The USA

Tuesday, April 26th, 2011

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services downgraded refunded municipal bonds that were rated AAA in a follow-up to its downgrade notice of the U.S. triple-A outlook to negative from stable.

S&P suggests that in a scenario of economic or political stress a local government could have a higher credit rating than the USA. So could Miami one day have a higher credit rating than the USA? Sounds like a stretch.

Interestingly, S&P said it does not tie ratings on state and local governments to that of the United States and as a result, existing outlooks on their triple-A ratings will not change because of the revision for the federal government.

But this seems inconsistent with the market realty. The entire muni bond industry estimates prices based on various factors. The spread to the US treasury is a main criteria. BondView research So are Pre Refunded muni bonds since they are a key benchmark and are backed by US treasuries. Common sense suggests there will most certainly be a price and yield effect on the benchmark Pre Refunded muni bond since they are priced at a spread to the AAA US tres bond.

If and when the AAA US Tres is downgraded, so will Pre-Re muni bonds backed by US treasuries also known. But thats just the effect on the top of the food chain. We would expect to see a wild ride for all other muni bonds since they are also priced relative to the AAA US treasury bond. But to make matters worse, about 1/2 of all muni bonds are not rated by a major credit rating agency. These unrated muni bonds will be in worse limbo then they are today.

What S&P actually said was that only about 4 percent of state and local issues are rated AAA with a stable outlook by S&P, which said the possibility exists that a state or local government could have a higher rating than their sovereign government “in a scenario of economic or political stress.” But its a stretch to suggest that say swinging Miami, Florida could have a higher credit rating than the US government, long considered the global benchmark for stability.

To see the real effect of interest rate changes on muni bond prices, go to bondview.com, a free resource for muni bond investors.

Beware of wounded credit-rating agencies

Wednesday, April 20th, 2011

As the U.S. has just discovered, a wounded credit-rating agency is a dangerous beast.

The raters stood accused of contributing to, even precipitating, financial crisis by awarding top grades to securities, institutions and even countries which proved unworthy of them, to put it mildly. They then compounded the error by lowering these ratings too slowly, or so the charge sheet reads.

Stung by such barbs, Standard & Poor’s Corp ., Moody’s Investors Service Inc. and Fitch Ratings have clearly resolved not to get caught behind the curve again. Hence, presumably, S&P’s seismic decision to give the U.S.’s gold-standard credit rating a negative outlook Monday.

Quite a start to the week.

In one sense, of course, the action tells us little we didn’t already know, and is merely a response to the agonizing budgetary wrangling taking place in Washington. It’s those pesky voters again, you see. They generally favor deficit reductions, but are not so keen on any measures which would hit their personal finances (this is the post-crisis catch-22 for governments all over the spent-out west).

However, brightening the structural fiscal outlook in Washington will require painful adjustments, and these are generally rare in the year or so prior to a Presidential election. What S&P has done is highlight the threat to both the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency, and the “risk free” position of U.S. debt if the next few months don’t prove an exception to this rule.

Legal Fights Over Credit Ratings-Firm Liability Rule

Friday, June 18th, 2010

Credit raters judge risk & value and were given special limited liability privileges because investors and markets crave their expert opinions. Ideally they provide an objective baseline for consistent rating when buying stocks, muni bonds and even collectables – like coins (PCGS) or even guitars. But Moodys and S&P abused their positions at precisely the wrong time – when bond investors needed them most.

So now what? Can the marketplace innovate by encouraging bond buyers to conduct their own research or think creatively about outsourcing that job, instead of reflexively relying on S.& P., Moody’s and Fitch? Are investors willing and able to become more knowledgeable about what, what and why they buy & sell? Hopefully yes, since it will make us all better investors.

The bottom line is that the credit rating industry must be deregulated into a blended solution of legacy and non regulated ratings firms. History clearly shows that markets have the intelligence to predict bad news thru market price based rating systems. For example, to see Market Ratings for any muni bond today go to http://www.bondview.com/marketratings a free analysis tools. 

Good Luck

Jim Walker
www.BondView.com

Andrew Ross Sorkin, from NY Times Discusses Ratings Meltdown on Brian Lehrer show (WNYC)

Friday, June 4th, 2010

Here is a good interview with our favorite radio host, Brain Lehrer from WNYC and Andrew Ross Sorkin, columnist and financial reporter for The New York Times as they discuss the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s focus on ratings agencies in today’s hearings, featuring Warren Buffet.

Muni Bond Defaults Need A louder Alarm

Tuesday, December 1st, 2009

Less than a month before the $43.4 million municipal bond default of Boston based Crosstown Center , some unsuspecting retail buyer purchased $100,000 of the now defaulted bonds. Whats troubling is that this purchase was made just 18 days after a rather cryptic material event notice filed thru the EMMA.org continuing disclosure system.

While we are really thrilled to see the positive strides made by the Municipal Securities Rule Making Board and its rather lovely www.emma.org muni bond continuing disclosure system, the impact of material event notices need to be made clearer to the consumer marketplace. Sure “Material Events” can cover a wide range of topics from benign notices to the Crosstown Center disaster. Even with low muni rates, how and when is a consumer suppose to know to watch their muni bonds for falling trees? How about a rating system for these material events on a 1-10 scale from insignificant to “timber….”. After all what good is a warning bell if no one hears it?

Enough with the complaints. How about a solution? History clearly shows that markets have the intelligence to predict bad news thru market price based rating systems. Some of the larger credit rating agencies even offer these products pricing products. But the consumer market doesn’t seem educated to the benefit of these smart market priced based credit ratings. However, Bondview has built in Market Ratings along with bond pricing of muni bonds and muni rates.

Okay then how about the original rating? The defaulted bonds carried a Moody’s rating of Baa3 when issued in 2002. How is it possible to loose $43 million so fast without the rating agencies even noticing?

We can only again recommend our esteemed NY Times colleague Gretchen Morgenson’s 10/10/09 article “When Bond Ratings Get Stale”. Within this well penned piece was detailed the most colorful of quotes during congressional hearings with Scott McCleskey, head of compliance at Moody’s from April 2006 to September 2008. He outlined Moodys failure to effectively monitor the ratings on thousands of muni bonds held by individual and institutional investors. McCleskey said that “in some cases there were bonds which had been outstanding for 10 or 20 years but which had never been looked at since the original rating. In the case of the Crosstown default, its only been 7 years.

In closing, its troubling that somehow Boston is not a “party to the default”and just goes to show that muni bonds really can be a mine field. Even the smart money didn’t see that train wreck coming. Several bond funds including muni bond powerhouse Nuveen, thru its Massachusetts Premium Income Municipal Fund, held Crosstown Center bonds valued at $963,000, according to a recent securities filing. Here are BondView’s yield curves of yesterdays Industrial Development Bonds trades from Massachusetts. They dont look bad now, but a good idea to steer clear of this category if they don’t have the full faith and credit of the municipality behind them.

Legacy Credit Ratings Don’t Jive With Market Reality

Sunday, October 11th, 2009

In mid August, the bond section of the Charles Schwab brokerage Web site said a representative ten-year, single-A muni yielded 5.9%, and a ten-year, triple-A yielded 4.1%. But when you look at the actual listings, you’ll often find anomalies: Some ten-year single-A bonds yielded as little as 3.7%, while a few uninsured triple-A bonds (those supported by tax revenues or utility bills) paid up to 4.5%. Clearly, legacy credit ratings don’t jive with market price realities  but market price based credit ratings  do. For example, look at the bonds of then highly rated  Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns  months before they imploded and the market had it right.  Bond-fund managers say they rely more on their own research to evaluate a bond’s price and yield, you should too and  you can trade smarter by taking  advantage of pricing inconsistencies.

Don’t sweat ratings downgrades on GOs?

Sunday, October 11th, 2009

In terms of safety, governors and state treasurers argue, GO state debt should be equivalent to Treasury bonds, or at least triple-A-rated corporate bonds. Although states can’t print their own money and are suffering budget problems during the recession, I tend to agree with the governors and treasurers. Don’t sweat ratings downgrades on GOs? Gee well the future will tell on this issue.