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Muni Bond Talk

Harrisburg, The Saga Continues

October 26th, 2011

Reports from Bloomberg were that Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett and the Harrisburg City Council are in a standoff resulting from Harrisburg’s filing of Chapter 9 bankruptcy last week. The governor is looking to overrule the city council’s action and have the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania take over the finances of the city.

The story – often reported by our friends at Cumberland Advisors – is that of an incinerator that was not needed, but built as a boondoggle. After failing to attract enough business, the city decided to spend much more money retrofitting the incinerator, putting the city’s pledge behind the bonds used to finance and retrofit. This turned into a disaster. The city stopped making payments on the incinerator debt last year. With much consternation and discussion, they have continued to pay debt service on their general-obligation bonds.

Last week the city council voted to declare Chapter 9 bankruptcy for Harrisburg, even though the Mayor of Harrisburg was against it and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania itself had passed a law declaring that it would be illegal for Harrisburg to declare bankruptcy.

There is now a court-mandated delay of a month to sort this out. On Monday, a judge for the US Bankruptcy Court in Pennsylvania set a November 23 court date to settle the legality of the bankruptcy declaration by the council.

Why is the state moving as if the matter has already been settled in its favor? It’s not just the politics, it’s the state not wanting Harrisburg’s woes to result in much higher borrowing costs for towns and cities in the rest of central Pennsylvania.

What do we see reflected in the municipal bond market, given the current state of affairs?

Most of the Harrisburg general-obligation debt is insured. Ratings on Harrisburg itself have been withdrawn by the rating agencies. Bonds backed by Assured Guaranty, the healthiest of the bond insurers (AA3 Moody’s and AA+ Standard and Poor’s) are trading at 5.5% to 6%. Bonds from downgraded insurer MBIA (now National RE), rated Baa1/BBB, are trading in the 6.25-6.50% range, and bonds with other insurers who are below investment-grade and have no rating are all over the lot, with trades in the 7%-plus range (levels courtesy of Oppenheimer). This is in a world where longer-maturity, high-grade Pennsylvania debt is trading in the 4.5% range.

The one thing we know for sure is that the bond insurers come down squarely of the opinion that Harrisburg has NOT taken the necessary steps to avoid bankruptcy: raising taxes, selling assets, and using their full faith and credit to pay their bonds.

So far, this has not carried over to the state’s own bonds, as far as any patina of higher yields associated with the problems of Harrisburg. The state sold bonds this week at their normal high-grade level.

Stay tuned as this develops.

Reprinted by permission from our friends at Cumberland Advisors

Harrisburg Burns

October 26th, 2011

We have written about Harrisburg PA.s struggle extensively during the past two years. A small city unable to pay off a jumbo-sized debt hasn’t shaken the muni market. Despite eye-catching headlines recently over Harrisburg bankruptcy filing, the news barely fazed other muni investors and probably rightly so.

A Messy Situation

Harrisburg’s financial woes stem from an incinerator originally built in 1972. Plagued with operating problems from the start, the city nevertheless decided to expand and retrofit the plant in 2003, taking on $125 million in debt. The initial contractor on the job went belly up, which led to more borrowing and debt that mushroomed to $310 million – a daunting sum for a city of 49,000 residents and a total municipal budget of less than $60 million. Ultimately, the city filed for bankruptcy, which the state is currently challenging in court.

Bonds Are Insured

Although Harrisburg’s move was unusual, the market hardly took notice. Harrisburg is not a significant issuer of bonds, and its financial plight has been well documented. A good portion of Harrisburg’s overall debt is insured, and many of the bonds associated with the incinerator are secured by Assured Guaranty, which made some payments the city previously missed. However, Assured credit rating has been lowered several times from AAA to where it is today.

While there are other cities and municipalities face strained finances, few are confronted with challenges similar to Harrisburg’s. Defaults continue to be extremely rare. Last year, municipal defaults totaled $2.65 billion, an 8.6% decline from 2009. So far this year, defaults total $1.1 billion, a small fraction of the $2.93 trillion in outstanding municipal bonds.

In the meantime, a judge placed Harrisburg’s bankruptcy on hold for a month, enabling bond insurers to file briefs in the case while state lawmakers are pushing to take over the city’s finances. Soon after Harrisburg filed for bankruptcy, the state sued, concurring with the mayor’s opposition to the filing. Harrisburg’s City Council voted three times over the summer to reject a financial recovery plan under the state’s program for distressed communities. All the decisions were carried by a 4-3 margin. The measure on October 12th to file bankruptcy was approved by the same 4-3 margin.

Municipal Tax Revenue Grows for 7th Straight Quarter.

October 2nd, 2011

Municipal credit revenue continues to improve. This week it was reported that US state and local government tax revenue rose almost 7% in the second quarter, from a year earlier. This marks seven quarters in a row of growth (following five quarters of decline). More importantly, tax revenue now slightly exceeds the peak of revenue set in 2008, before the financial crisis set in.

This is important on two counts. First, it blunts the Meredith Whitney arguments that led to the bond-fund sell-off last winter. But also, it reinforces the argument about the quality of municipal credits. Many state and local municipal entities enjoy captive audiences – for water, sewer, transportation, etc. They performed in this recession like they have in others, by tightening belts, cutting costs, and raising fees where necessary. And this has been a big contributor to the curing of the muni market since last winter.

The White House proposals are keeping muni rates high. The Obama administration’s Jobs Bill has proposed imposing a tax on individuals or couples above certain income thresholds, to essentially eliminate the tax advantage enjoyed between the 28% and 35% tax bracket. This 7% tax would translate into roughly a 35-basis-point tax on muni yields (4-4.5% range). We do not think there is much chance of this proposal being enacted – certainly not to include existing municipal bonds. However, the uncertainty is helping to contribute to tax-exempt bond yields which are much higher than they would be without it. In some cases, taxable BABs (Build America Bonds) yields are only marginally higher than the tax-exempt form of the very same credit. The market has started to see cross-over buyers respond to this anomaly.

As we head into the last quarter of the year we expect to see municipal supply pick up. It downshifted greatly early in the year, due to the high interest rates fostered by the Whitney meltdown. With lower nominal rates, visible supply is starting to pick up. But the December/January reinvestment period should also be vigorous – especially given the volatility of the equity market. That should mean most of the reinvestment goes back into the muni market.

And after much consternation on all sides, we do not expect the Administration proposals with regard to tax-free bonds to pass. This should also mean that the muni market will return to more normalized pricing levels relative to Treasuries.

Thanks to our friends at Cumberland Advisors.

SEC suspects leaks at ratings agencies.

October 2nd, 2011

Strike up another body blow against the big three credit ratings agencies. The SEC said the in-house procedures of one of the world’s top three ratings agencies has been leaking its decisions in advance of public dissemination, according to a report by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

While no agencies were named in the report, at one of the larger agencies the SEC said “the procedures for disseminating a pending rating action appeared to allow for limited dissemination of a pending rating action in some instances prior to public dissemination.” While they didnt name the agency there has been much speculation that Standard & Poors was the prime target of the probe.

We find this very troubling for the municipal bond ratings industry and another reason for investors to use market implied ratings which are disseminated to all investors immediately.

The 23-page document is the latest report released by the SEC on the major ratings agencies — Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s — and seven others of lesser stature which are recognized in the United States.

Annual checks of the agencies were introduced under a financial reform law that came into effect in July last year. Up until then, the checks were carried out every two years. This latest report covers the 2009-2010 period. No agencies were named throughout the report.

The powerful “big three” raters have been accused of contributing to the global financial crisis by helping propel the sale of risky investments such as mortgage-backed securities just to net more business.

The agencies, suspected of multiple conflicts of interest, are the focus of several US probes. S&P’s decision in August 2011 to strip the United States of its sterling AAA credit rating was preceded by several media reports announcing the decision was imminent.

The SEC noted that each of the big three had “made changes to improve its operations since the 2007-08 examinations.”Commission staff made a series of recommendations to each agency for improvements, notably on how to handle conflicts of interest, the report said.

Obama’s Jobs Bill Will Punish Muni bonds.

September 13th, 2011

Obama’s Jobs Bill Will Punish Muni bonds. Municipal bonds have always been synonymous with tax-free income. That would end if President Obama gets his way. The Obama Administration wants to raise taxes on “high earners” defined as couples earning more than $250k to pay for the jobs bill. Yet in many US cities the $250k earnings level represents the upper middle class not the wealthy. And retail middle class bond investors own 70% of all municipal bonds. Changing the tax free investment status rules retroactively on muni bonds will completely disrupt the investment marketplace.

That said, while reviewing the tax exempt status afforded to muni bonds is a legitimate question for a democracy and all its people to consider, it should be addressed forthrightly, not by the back-door mechanisms being proposed by the administrative branch. If Washington wants to change the tax status on newly issued bonds by states and municipalities, thats reasonable as the success with the Build America Bond has already proved, a direct subsidy to issuers is more efficient than tax exemption.

Here is more below on this issue from Barron’s ever prescient columnist Randall Forsyth.

Under the jobs bill the President sent to Congress Monday, high-income individuals and families would no longer receive interest from state and municipal bonds free completely from federal income taxes, beginning in 2013. The legislation would also reduce the value of tax deductions for taxpayers in the highest bracket.

Specifically, individuals earning over $200,000 and families earning over $250,000 would effectively have the value of tax breaks against the top 35% bracket lowered to the 28% bracket.

The proposed change would help pay the $447 billion tab for the American Jobs Act of 2011. There have been previous attempts to enact a back-door tax hike on the upper brackets. Reformers have asserted that it is unfair that high-income taxpayers receive a greater benefit from deductions; a $1,000 deduction saves somebody in a 35% bracket $350, $70 more than the same deduction saves a taxpayer in the 28% bracket.

Never before have high-income investors in municipal bonds been so targeted, however. With the exception of so-called private-purpose bonds subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax, interest on munis generally was exempt from federal income taxes.

As with deductions, the tax-free feature on munis is more valuable to investors in the top income-tax brackets. For that reason, Internal Revenue Service data show that 58% of all tax-exempt income was earned by individuals earning over $200,000, according to The Bond Buyer, the muni-market trade paper.

For instance, a tax-free bond that yields 3.50% (about the going rate on a 30-year, triple-A muni) is equivalent to a taxable bond that yields 5.38% for an investor in the 35% tax bracket. But for an investor in the 28% bracket, that 3.50% muni is equivalent to a taxable yield of 4.86%.

All else being equal, the yield on muni bonds would have to rise to compensate for the lesser tax benefit, if the Obama jobs bill is enacted as proposed. For instance, a rise of 50 basis points (one-half percentage point) would result in a price decline of about 9% for a 30-year bond — equal to $90,000 for a $1 million holding.

As a result, upper-income investors would suffer the dual blow of lower after-tax income and capital losses from their muni-bond portfolios.

That could severe repercussions for the muni market, which only in recent months has recovered from the so-far errant prediction of hundreds of defaults totaling billions of dollars from analyst Meredith Whitney.

“In my opinion, this will have a negative effect on the muni market and could start another wave of heavy withdrawals from muni-bond funds, even though many investors in these funds will be minimally affected,” says Ken Woods, who head Asset Preservation Advisors, an Atlanta manager of bond portfolios specializing in high-net-worth individuals. “The muni investor’s thought process will be, ‘the government’s next step could be the complete elimination of the [tax] exemption.’”

One of the ironies of this proposal in the so-called jobs bill is that the measure contains infrastructure spending, some $38 billion worth. It would also create an infrastructure bank to fund such projects.

But reducing demand for bonds issued by state and regional authorities that build highways, bridges, airports, water and sewer systems and transportation projections would hamper the very sort of projects the legislation seeks to encourage.

Obviously, the proposal to reduce the appeal of muni bonds to high-income investors is aimed at sentiments such as voiced recently by Berkshire Hathaway’s Warren Buffett, who lamented his tax rate was lower than his secretary’s.

If the Obama Administration wants to raise taxes on high earners to reduce income and wealth inequality, that is a legitimate question in a democracy. But it should be addressed forthrightly, not by back-door mechanisms.

And if Washington wants to change the tax status on newly issued bonds by states and municipalities, that also is legitimate. A direct subsidy to issuers is more efficient than tax exemption.

But to change the rules after the fact on an investment that has always been tax-free, as in the case of munis, isn’t just counterproductive; it’s not fair.

Credit Raters Should Follow American ‘Idol’ Judges

September 3rd, 2011

“American Idol” is the most watched television show ever. Steven Tyler and the other judges do a fine job rating contestants. But the judging skills of the big 3 credit raters have failed the US Investing public. And now the US Congress is in the process of pulling their prime time status.

Whats the lesson here for credit raters? Investors vote thru their wallets. Assets are worth what the marketplace is willing to pay… No more no less. Its common knowledge that credit ratings can be easily derived from asset prices by using market implied credit ratings. These ratings are in place for all municipal bonds at bondview.

The even prescient Bart Chilton, commissioner on the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission has some good comments about all this.

On Aug. 5, the Standard and Poor’s rating agency downgraded the United States from AAA to AA+. That news ran across front pages. Since the early 1900s, when ratings began, this was the first time the United States wasn’t rated AAA.

S & P’s downgrade was based upon its view that Washington politics remain unstable and therefore deficit-reduction measures will not be attainable. Additionally, their decision was fueled by a $2 trillion calculation “error.” The direct impact on markets was colossal. The Monday following the release of the rating, the Dow dropped 635 points!

Remember, some of these agencies (like S & P) are the ones who got ratings so very wrong a few years ago. Not only did they give favorable ratings to firms that ultimately went under during the economic fiasco, they maintained AAA ratings on pools of junk mortgages packaged by Wall Street banks, trading away credible ratings for the bottom line of the ratings agencies. Do we really want to continue to rely upon such agencies?

Now consider “Idol” judge Steven Tyler (the flamboyant Aerosmith front man). He provides insightful commentary based upon his music and performance experience. What he says colors contestant performances with a professional texture viewers might not otherwise notice. What he and the other judges do not do is render the final judgment. That’s up to the viewers.

Ratings agencies need to be more like “Idol”: providing information, but not making final judgments that drastically influence outcomes. They should be more informative and insightful, but not deterministic. They’ve become excessively powerful and create a self-fulfilling prophesy about what markets will do. As one member of Congress asked the heads of the ratings agencies, “How could you possibly make that kind of a decision based on an opinion when you have millions of people relying on that?”

Furthermore, smaller ratings agencies should be encouraged to compete, rather than relying upon three agencies comprising 97 percent of all ratings. Importantly, agencies should work for consumers, not deal makers – a business model that incentivizes agencies to provide favorable ratings.

As Tyler sings, it’s time to stop “Livin’ on the Edge” of the financial teeter totter subject to faulty ratings agencies. We need to change the way the raters operate. We have seen the damage they can create and we should accept the status quo “No more, no more.”

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The US Downgrade and the Muni Bonds

August 10th, 2011

We have fielded many questions in the last few days about what effect the downgrade of the United States debt from AAA to AA+ and the effect on the 11,000 or so municipal bonds that S&P subsequently downgraded. Investors and professionals want to know what they should do with the muin bond portfolios.

The bonds that may be effected most include Housing bonds (bonds with the backing of federal agencies like GNMA and FNMA) will see their S&P ratings affected. Certain lease bonds with the federal government as a tenant may see their ratings downgraded, depending on the proportion that the federal government is responsible for on the leases

Pre refunded and escrowed municipal bonds, the gold standard for munis: These are generally older, higher-coupon bonds that have been defeased by their issuers. Proceeds of “refunding” issues are placed in Treasury securities to pay interest and call the older bonds at the first call date. This results in significant cost savings for the municipalities, and the older bonds are often (but not always) re-rated AAA based on the US Treasuries, which are now backing the older bonds. These bonds will see a downgrade.

What does this mean from a portfolio-management sense? In our view, it should not affect the muni market greatly. In our opinion, the United States is still the premier sovereign credit in the world. Investors will continue to own prerefunded bonds in the shorter-maturity end of a barbell strategy.

It is important to remember that both Moody’s and Fitch continue to rate the US as “AAA” including housing bonds backed by the federal government or prerefunded bonds or bonds backed by federal leases. As strange as it sounds, because state and local governments and their agencies are rated on different criteria than governments, some municipal issuers will have S&P credit ratings higher than the federal government.

The smart muni bond professionals who fly in our circle are saying the municipal marketplace will still react to the same forces it has in the past: high demand for tax free bonds propping up prices due to low supply, retail buy and hold investors ignoring much of the fray, bond fund redemptions of high quality bonds causing a pricing ripple effect on on all other muni bonds and the lack of clear insight into the why and how of credit ratings.

MSRB Steps Up Its Game To Warn “Play Fair or Else”

August 8th, 2011

The MSRB took a defensive posture in the wake of the S&P’s downgrade on the USA by warning dealers that despite the potential market disruption, investor protection rules continue to apply and that all trading activity will be monitored as usual. As an example the MSRB said it would be unfair for a bond purchase by a dealer at a low price followed by a resale shortly thereafter at a considerably higher price. What effect this will have on the markets are unclear until we see the trickle down to prices as a result of S&P’s downgrade on the USA’s long term debt. Here is the release or you can read below

MSRB INFORMATION RELEASE As a result of actions and statements by certain Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations regarding the credit rating of the United States and the associated review of scurities of some states and municipalities, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) is publishing a reminder to dealers relating to the application of MSRB investor protection rules in the context of the potential impact of such ratings action on the municipal securities market.

The MSRB reminds brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers that, in spite of any market disruption that may result from such rating actions, all MSRB rules continue to apply, including rules on fair practice, trade pricing, suitability and disclosure.

MSRB ADVISES DEALERS ON CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS IN LIGHT OF POTENTIAL MUNICIPAL RATINGS ACTIONS
On August 5, 2011, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Service reduced the sovereign credit rating of the United States from “AAA” to “AA+.” On August 2, 2011, Moody’s Investors Service (“Moody’s”) confirmed its United States government bond rating at “Aaa,” although Moody’s assigned the rating a “negative outlook.” On August 2, 2011, Fitch Ratings announced that it has maintained its “AAA” U.S. sovereign debt rating but said that it continued to review the credit and expected that the review would be complete by the end of August 2011. Certain of these Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (“Rating Agencies”) have also said that the securities of some states and municipalities are under review for possible downgrade as a result of their direct or indirect links to the credit of the United States. They had previously stated that, should they take negative rating actions on the debt of the United States, they also would likely downgrade debt directly or indirectly linked to the United States sovereign rating, as well as the ratings of certain municipal issuers that either have large numbers of federal employees in their jurisdiction or that are significantly reliant on federal government funding.

Although to date the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”) has observed no unusual municipal market activity, as a result of this continuing uncertainty concerning the ratings of such states and local governments the MSRB is publishing this reminder notice relating to the application of MSRB investor protection rules in the context of the potential impact of such ratings actions on the municipal securities market.

The MSRB reminds brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) that, in spite of any market disruption that may result from such rating actions, all MSRB rules continue to apply, including rules on fair practice, trade pricing, suitability and disclosure. The MSRB is particularly concerned about the treatment of retail investors. MSRB Rule G-17 prohibits dealers from using a situation of market disruption to attempt to manipulate the pricing of municipal securities, either alone or in concert. Further, such situation does not negate a dealer’s duty under MSRB Rule G-30 (on prices and commissions) to purchase bonds from a customer or sell bonds to a customer as a principal at prices (including any markdown or markup) that are fair and reasonable based on prevailing market conditions.

As always, if the MSRB becomes aware of allegations that any dealer has attempted to take advantage of clients by trading in municipal securities at prices that are not fair and reasonable, the MSRB will notify the appropriate enforcement agencies and, if the allegations are true, recommend severe sanctions. One potential indication of such unfair behavior would be a purchase by a dealer at a low price followed by a resale shortly thereafter at a considerably higher price. While the MSRB recognizes that market disruption can present significant challenges to establishing a fair and reasonable price with precision, Rules G-17 and G-30 do not permit dealers to improperly take advantage of their clients by executing trades at prices that are not fair and reasonable. The MSRB encourages dealers that utilize computerized or other pricing models to review them carefully to determine that the prices they generate are fair and reasonable, particularly if such models were not designed to take into consideration the direct or indirect impact of a material downgrade in United States credit ratings.

The exretailistence of a market disruption also does not negate a dealer’s duty to ensure that their recommendations are consistent with their obligations under MSRB Rule G-19 (on suitability of recommendations), which can be a significant concern in the context of investors who may rely on the recommendations of their dealers during this time of uncertainty. Further, dealers are reminded that all material facts concerning a transaction known to the dealer or available from established industry sources must be disclosed to the client at or prior to the time of sale, under MSRB Rule G-17.

The MSRB will continue to monitor developments in the marketplace and any potential concerns resulting from any ratings actions.

August 8, 2011

With U.S. AAA Downgrade, Could Munis Default As Meredith Predicted?

August 7th, 2011

The tax-free municipal bond market looks vastly different as we head toward the end of the second quarter of 2011 than it did when we were in the middle of the Meredith Whitney-led meltdown in January of this year.

In January the muni market was battered by the continued onslaught of municipal bond fund redemptions. Most of this damage occurred after Ms. Whitney’s appearance on 60 Minutes in December, when she forecast “hundreds of billions” of municipal defaults in 2011. This started the unmitigated selling, which peaked at over $4 billion per week in January. Because bond fund selling was mostly long-maturity bonds (and the funds own higher-yielding, longer-term bonds to pay their dividends), municipal bond yields soared, with long-term yields reaching 5.15% in the AAA range and between 5.5 and 6% on many high-grade revenue bonds. The bid side was often nonexistent, and liquidity was very spotty.

As Cumberland readers know, the signs were very evident that this was liquidity-driven, not credit-driven. Among these signs was the opposite movement of FALLING yields in the Build America Bonds taxable market, on the very same credits whose yields were being driven higher in the tax-free market. This was because pension funds, foreigners, and other taxable buyers were embracing the municipal credit that the retail investor was rejecting. The other sign was the fact that shorter-term yields had moved very little in the tax-free municipal market – if a true credit event had taken place, yields across the whole maturity spectrum would have moved up sharply.

As we hit the halfway point of the year, we see that 30-year AAA tax-free yields have fallen from 5.11% to 4.37% (source: Bloomberg), a drop of 75 basis points; and 10-year AAA yields have fallen from 3.47% to 2.63%, a drop of 84 basis points. Now, of course, there have been movements in Treasury yields, as well as market concern of a possible slowing economy, that have sent those yields down.

It is important to remember that this is AAA scale. Many high-grade bonds in the A and AA categories traded MUCH cheaper in January. But it is useful to look at the relative value of Treasuries and Munis from January to now. The biggest improvement in ratios was in the 10-year range. But because of the longer duration of 30-year bonds, the biggest improvement in price was in the longer end of the market.

The reasons behind this lie in the fact that most of the damage was in the long-maturity end of the market, since this was where most of the bond fund selling was concentrated. This is the area which could cure the most. Also, new-issue municipals this year are substantially reduced. Part of this was the “move up” of municipal supply at year-end from what would have been early-2011 issuance. This, of course, helped start the downdraft in the muni market in November, as issuers wanted to beat the expiration of the Build America Bonds program. Also, many state and local governments that had flexibility did not issue bonds at the nominally high yields that persisted early this year. We expect the first half of this year to close with approximately $110 billion in issuance. We expect the current lower rates will induce MORE supply in the second half of this year, but 2011 will most likely end up close to $250 billion – a marked decline from recent years.

The overall improvement in municipal finances has also contributed to improvement in the market. State and local governments (in total) are heading toward the sixth quarter in a row of RISING tax receipts. Also, problems in the pension area, which have gotten widespread press coverage, have started to be addressed. We expect this trend to continue.

The selling has abated in the municipal fund arena. Though most weeks have seen outflows, they are much smaller, and there were actually inflows a couple of weeks. Part of this is just the normal abatement of pressures, but it is also the recognition, even among retail investors, that things had really reached a point where the market was severely oversold.

The stock market, after turning in a very good performance through April of this year, has turned jittery with the Dow Jones shedding almost 900 points since the start of May. This has caused somewhat of a re-assessment of the needs of fixed income in overall investment portfolios. Presumably some of the fund selling went into equities and, depending on the timing, these assets could have been whipsawed.

We are now in the middle of a large reinvestment period where approximately $100 billion is rolling off through a mixture of coupon payments, maturing bonds, and called bonds. With fund selling reduced and some wariness in the stock market, we expect a lot of this money to now be reinvested in the bond market.

We realize that, while the municipal market is still cheap on a relative basis in the very short end and in the long end, the “giveaway market” of January and February has certainly turned around. This is causing us to be more cautious from a maturity and duration standpoint as we manage portfolios.

Reprinted with permission from our friends at Cumberland Advisors

Cleaning Up the Muni Market

August 7th, 2011

Two well professors are proposing that states and localities create a national nonprofit institution that would provide issuers with independent advice on bond financings, help them disclose standardized information and take other steps to improve liquidity in the muni market. Professor Andrew Ang from Columbia University and Richard Greene from Carnegie Mellon says an independent, non-profit advisory organization for municipalities could increase transparency and liquidity in the muni bond market, sweeping billions of dollars back to taxpayers and investors. Economists and taxpayers, safe to say, always share at least one perspective: they hate to see inefficient markets because that means money is going to waste. Municipal bond markets are highly inefficient and could benefit from a good clean up to turn billions of dollars in back to investors and municipalities — and by extension, to taxpayers.

The value that is being siphoned away through the muni market, Professor Andrew Ang says, can be attributed to two flaws: the market is both highly illiquid and very opaque, costing investors and municipalities billions of dollars every year.

When states, cities, and other municipalities issue bonds to raise money for public projects, they depend on intermediary brokers to match them with buyers. These buyers face difficulties in selling these bonds if they require their invested capital back early because secondary markets are illiquid and trading costs are extremely high. Furthermore, no standard system exists to get timely, accurate information about the roughly 1.5 million bond issues on the market, or the financial condition of any of the 50,000-plus institutions that issue municipal bonds.

In practical terms, then, it’s difficult to meaningfully compare bond prices and other important market information valuable to buyers and sellers. “In any type of market where you have illiquidity and poor information, bad things happen,” Ang says. “In the muni market, that means unnecessary costs in the forms of interest expense, fees from brokers, and other transaction costs for investors and issuers.”

Ang worked with fellow economist Richard Green of Carnegie Mellon to develop a proposal for redirecting billions back to public coffers and investors. First, they documented the severe illiquidity and transactions costs in the municipal market and the lack of timely and useful information available to investors. Researchers estimate the annual amount that investors overpay combined with what municipalities are losing to administration and transaction costs at around $30 billion per year — interest costs to municipalities would be more than 1 percent lower if muni markets had the same liquidity as US Treasury bonds.

The solution proposed by Ang and Green could recoup many unnecessary costs associated with the muni market as it is currently organized, by creating an independent, nonprofit organization — CommonMuni — to advise issuers and provide better information to all players in the market.

CommonMuni would advise cities and states on best practices, for example, how to avoid refinancing that incurs long-term losses, or reduce costs associated with bond issues, or how and when to use derivatives with bond issues. Its other important activities, particularly early on, aim to increase transparency, since this would improve the quality and amount of information available to buyers and sellers, thereby improving liquidity.

Most importantly, CommonMuni could provide independent, high quality advice backed by its large resources to municipal issuers that would be prohibitively costly, or difficult to access, for individual municipalities to access on their own. Better structuring of municipal issues and lower issuance costs mean substantial savings to taxpayers.

CommonMuni would encourage the creation of simple bond issues, discouraging clients from structuring bond issues in overly complex ways and encouraging standardization. This would make it much easier for investors to compare bond features and prices, in turn facilitating buying and selling. Increased standardization could allow CommonMuni to pool small bond issues into larger pools, which would give smaller municipalities stronger footing in the market by broadening their potential market of buyers.

CommonMuni would help municipalities standardize, collect, and distribute financial reports, another activity aimed at improving information and transparency. CommonMuni can encourage the creation of centralized exchanges where muni bonds could be bought and sold, which would allow investors to cut out intermediaries, reducing costs.

In proposing CommonMuni, Ang and Green took many cues from the CommonFund, an investment advising nonprofit that was founded in 1971 by the Ford Foundation to help originally fewer than one hundred — now thousands — of colleges and universities pool endowment funds and obtain investment advice. The CommonFund has helped these schools dramatically reduce the costs of administering their investment programs, grow endowments, and increase endowment contributions to offset operating expenses.

Ang and Green estimate $25 million would be required to start CommonMuni. That is less than 1/10th of 1 percent of the total projected annual savings they estimate would be generated by the project. “There are few places where states and municipalities can find billions of dollars per year for effectively nothing, especially in this environment,” Ang notes.

By attracting private grant money to fund start-up costs, CommonMuni would minimize conflicts of interest that could arise with a city-, state-, or intermediary-funded effort. It would start small, offering basic services to a modest initial client base, adding services as it attracts more clients. In the beginning, some municipal officials might be reluctant to move to CommonMuni, if only out of simple resistance to change. But, once CommonMuni starts to become successful, by lowering the borrowing costs of its founding members, other municipalities will be drawn in further improving liquidity and information for all investors and issuers.

Retail investors should welcome CommonMuni as they are able to transact at better prices in more liquid markets. However, broker-dealers and financial intermediaries may lose money in a more transparent and liquid muni market, but in the long term, they would be fine, says Ang. “We once didn’t have very good disclosure for public companies. But the New Deal improved disclosure, and now everyone is better off.”

“CommonMuni is common sense, but there are a lot of players in this market who have a vested interest in the status quo and don’t want things to change,” Ang says. “But that money need not go to financial intermediaries; it belongs to taxpayers and investors.”