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Posts Tagged ‘credit ratings’

The US Downgrade and the Muni Bonds

Wednesday, August 10th, 2011

We have fielded many questions in the last few days about what effect the downgrade of the United States debt from AAA to AA+ and the effect on the 11,000 or so municipal bonds that S&P subsequently downgraded. Investors and professionals want to know what they should do with the muin bond portfolios.

The bonds that may be effected most include Housing bonds (bonds with the backing of federal agencies like GNMA and FNMA) will see their S&P ratings affected. Certain lease bonds with the federal government as a tenant may see their ratings downgraded, depending on the proportion that the federal government is responsible for on the leases

Pre refunded and escrowed municipal bonds, the gold standard for munis: These are generally older, higher-coupon bonds that have been defeased by their issuers. Proceeds of “refunding” issues are placed in Treasury securities to pay interest and call the older bonds at the first call date. This results in significant cost savings for the municipalities, and the older bonds are often (but not always) re-rated AAA based on the US Treasuries, which are now backing the older bonds. These bonds will see a downgrade.

What does this mean from a portfolio-management sense? In our view, it should not affect the muni market greatly. In our opinion, the United States is still the premier sovereign credit in the world. Investors will continue to own prerefunded bonds in the shorter-maturity end of a barbell strategy.

It is important to remember that both Moody’s and Fitch continue to rate the US as “AAA” including housing bonds backed by the federal government or prerefunded bonds or bonds backed by federal leases. As strange as it sounds, because state and local governments and their agencies are rated on different criteria than governments, some municipal issuers will have S&P credit ratings higher than the federal government.

The smart muni bond professionals who fly in our circle are saying the municipal marketplace will still react to the same forces it has in the past: high demand for tax free bonds propping up prices due to low supply, retail buy and hold investors ignoring much of the fray, bond fund redemptions of high quality bonds causing a pricing ripple effect on on all other muni bonds and the lack of clear insight into the why and how of credit ratings.

MSRB Steps Up Its Game To Warn “Play Fair or Else”

Monday, August 8th, 2011

The MSRB took a defensive posture in the wake of the S&P’s downgrade on the USA by warning dealers that despite the potential market disruption, investor protection rules continue to apply and that all trading activity will be monitored as usual. As an example the MSRB said it would be unfair for a bond purchase by a dealer at a low price followed by a resale shortly thereafter at a considerably higher price. What effect this will have on the markets are unclear until we see the trickle down to prices as a result of S&P’s downgrade on the USA’s long term debt. Here is the release or you can read below

MSRB INFORMATION RELEASE As a result of actions and statements by certain Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations regarding the credit rating of the United States and the associated review of scurities of some states and municipalities, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) is publishing a reminder to dealers relating to the application of MSRB investor protection rules in the context of the potential impact of such ratings action on the municipal securities market.

The MSRB reminds brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers that, in spite of any market disruption that may result from such rating actions, all MSRB rules continue to apply, including rules on fair practice, trade pricing, suitability and disclosure.

MSRB ADVISES DEALERS ON CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS IN LIGHT OF POTENTIAL MUNICIPAL RATINGS ACTIONS
On August 5, 2011, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Service reduced the sovereign credit rating of the United States from “AAA” to “AA+.” On August 2, 2011, Moody’s Investors Service (“Moody’s”) confirmed its United States government bond rating at “Aaa,” although Moody’s assigned the rating a “negative outlook.” On August 2, 2011, Fitch Ratings announced that it has maintained its “AAA” U.S. sovereign debt rating but said that it continued to review the credit and expected that the review would be complete by the end of August 2011. Certain of these Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (“Rating Agencies”) have also said that the securities of some states and municipalities are under review for possible downgrade as a result of their direct or indirect links to the credit of the United States. They had previously stated that, should they take negative rating actions on the debt of the United States, they also would likely downgrade debt directly or indirectly linked to the United States sovereign rating, as well as the ratings of certain municipal issuers that either have large numbers of federal employees in their jurisdiction or that are significantly reliant on federal government funding.

Although to date the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”) has observed no unusual municipal market activity, as a result of this continuing uncertainty concerning the ratings of such states and local governments the MSRB is publishing this reminder notice relating to the application of MSRB investor protection rules in the context of the potential impact of such ratings actions on the municipal securities market.

The MSRB reminds brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) that, in spite of any market disruption that may result from such rating actions, all MSRB rules continue to apply, including rules on fair practice, trade pricing, suitability and disclosure. The MSRB is particularly concerned about the treatment of retail investors. MSRB Rule G-17 prohibits dealers from using a situation of market disruption to attempt to manipulate the pricing of municipal securities, either alone or in concert. Further, such situation does not negate a dealer’s duty under MSRB Rule G-30 (on prices and commissions) to purchase bonds from a customer or sell bonds to a customer as a principal at prices (including any markdown or markup) that are fair and reasonable based on prevailing market conditions.

As always, if the MSRB becomes aware of allegations that any dealer has attempted to take advantage of clients by trading in municipal securities at prices that are not fair and reasonable, the MSRB will notify the appropriate enforcement agencies and, if the allegations are true, recommend severe sanctions. One potential indication of such unfair behavior would be a purchase by a dealer at a low price followed by a resale shortly thereafter at a considerably higher price. While the MSRB recognizes that market disruption can present significant challenges to establishing a fair and reasonable price with precision, Rules G-17 and G-30 do not permit dealers to improperly take advantage of their clients by executing trades at prices that are not fair and reasonable. The MSRB encourages dealers that utilize computerized or other pricing models to review them carefully to determine that the prices they generate are fair and reasonable, particularly if such models were not designed to take into consideration the direct or indirect impact of a material downgrade in United States credit ratings.

The exretailistence of a market disruption also does not negate a dealer’s duty to ensure that their recommendations are consistent with their obligations under MSRB Rule G-19 (on suitability of recommendations), which can be a significant concern in the context of investors who may rely on the recommendations of their dealers during this time of uncertainty. Further, dealers are reminded that all material facts concerning a transaction known to the dealer or available from established industry sources must be disclosed to the client at or prior to the time of sale, under MSRB Rule G-17.

The MSRB will continue to monitor developments in the marketplace and any potential concerns resulting from any ratings actions.

August 8, 2011

With U.S. AAA Downgrade, Could Munis Default As Meredith Predicted?

Sunday, August 7th, 2011

The tax-free municipal bond market looks vastly different as we head toward the end of the second quarter of 2011 than it did when we were in the middle of the Meredith Whitney-led meltdown in January of this year.

In January the muni market was battered by the continued onslaught of municipal bond fund redemptions. Most of this damage occurred after Ms. Whitney’s appearance on 60 Minutes in December, when she forecast “hundreds of billions” of municipal defaults in 2011. This started the unmitigated selling, which peaked at over $4 billion per week in January. Because bond fund selling was mostly long-maturity bonds (and the funds own higher-yielding, longer-term bonds to pay their dividends), municipal bond yields soared, with long-term yields reaching 5.15% in the AAA range and between 5.5 and 6% on many high-grade revenue bonds. The bid side was often nonexistent, and liquidity was very spotty.

As Cumberland readers know, the signs were very evident that this was liquidity-driven, not credit-driven. Among these signs was the opposite movement of FALLING yields in the Build America Bonds taxable market, on the very same credits whose yields were being driven higher in the tax-free market. This was because pension funds, foreigners, and other taxable buyers were embracing the municipal credit that the retail investor was rejecting. The other sign was the fact that shorter-term yields had moved very little in the tax-free municipal market – if a true credit event had taken place, yields across the whole maturity spectrum would have moved up sharply.

As we hit the halfway point of the year, we see that 30-year AAA tax-free yields have fallen from 5.11% to 4.37% (source: Bloomberg), a drop of 75 basis points; and 10-year AAA yields have fallen from 3.47% to 2.63%, a drop of 84 basis points. Now, of course, there have been movements in Treasury yields, as well as market concern of a possible slowing economy, that have sent those yields down.

It is important to remember that this is AAA scale. Many high-grade bonds in the A and AA categories traded MUCH cheaper in January. But it is useful to look at the relative value of Treasuries and Munis from January to now. The biggest improvement in ratios was in the 10-year range. But because of the longer duration of 30-year bonds, the biggest improvement in price was in the longer end of the market.

The reasons behind this lie in the fact that most of the damage was in the long-maturity end of the market, since this was where most of the bond fund selling was concentrated. This is the area which could cure the most. Also, new-issue municipals this year are substantially reduced. Part of this was the “move up” of municipal supply at year-end from what would have been early-2011 issuance. This, of course, helped start the downdraft in the muni market in November, as issuers wanted to beat the expiration of the Build America Bonds program. Also, many state and local governments that had flexibility did not issue bonds at the nominally high yields that persisted early this year. We expect the first half of this year to close with approximately $110 billion in issuance. We expect the current lower rates will induce MORE supply in the second half of this year, but 2011 will most likely end up close to $250 billion – a marked decline from recent years.

The overall improvement in municipal finances has also contributed to improvement in the market. State and local governments (in total) are heading toward the sixth quarter in a row of RISING tax receipts. Also, problems in the pension area, which have gotten widespread press coverage, have started to be addressed. We expect this trend to continue.

The selling has abated in the municipal fund arena. Though most weeks have seen outflows, they are much smaller, and there were actually inflows a couple of weeks. Part of this is just the normal abatement of pressures, but it is also the recognition, even among retail investors, that things had really reached a point where the market was severely oversold.

The stock market, after turning in a very good performance through April of this year, has turned jittery with the Dow Jones shedding almost 900 points since the start of May. This has caused somewhat of a re-assessment of the needs of fixed income in overall investment portfolios. Presumably some of the fund selling went into equities and, depending on the timing, these assets could have been whipsawed.

We are now in the middle of a large reinvestment period where approximately $100 billion is rolling off through a mixture of coupon payments, maturing bonds, and called bonds. With fund selling reduced and some wariness in the stock market, we expect a lot of this money to now be reinvested in the bond market.

We realize that, while the municipal market is still cheap on a relative basis in the very short end and in the long end, the “giveaway market” of January and February has certainly turned around. This is causing us to be more cautious from a maturity and duration standpoint as we manage portfolios.

Reprinted with permission from our friends at Cumberland Advisors

Cleaning Up the Muni Market

Sunday, August 7th, 2011

Two well professors are proposing that states and localities create a national nonprofit institution that would provide issuers with independent advice on bond financings, help them disclose standardized information and take other steps to improve liquidity in the muni market. Professor Andrew Ang from Columbia University and Richard Greene from Carnegie Mellon says an independent, non-profit advisory organization for municipalities could increase transparency and liquidity in the muni bond market, sweeping billions of dollars back to taxpayers and investors. Economists and taxpayers, safe to say, always share at least one perspective: they hate to see inefficient markets because that means money is going to waste. Municipal bond markets are highly inefficient and could benefit from a good clean up to turn billions of dollars in back to investors and municipalities — and by extension, to taxpayers.

The value that is being siphoned away through the muni market, Professor Andrew Ang says, can be attributed to two flaws: the market is both highly illiquid and very opaque, costing investors and municipalities billions of dollars every year.

When states, cities, and other municipalities issue bonds to raise money for public projects, they depend on intermediary brokers to match them with buyers. These buyers face difficulties in selling these bonds if they require their invested capital back early because secondary markets are illiquid and trading costs are extremely high. Furthermore, no standard system exists to get timely, accurate information about the roughly 1.5 million bond issues on the market, or the financial condition of any of the 50,000-plus institutions that issue municipal bonds.

In practical terms, then, it’s difficult to meaningfully compare bond prices and other important market information valuable to buyers and sellers. “In any type of market where you have illiquidity and poor information, bad things happen,” Ang says. “In the muni market, that means unnecessary costs in the forms of interest expense, fees from brokers, and other transaction costs for investors and issuers.”

Ang worked with fellow economist Richard Green of Carnegie Mellon to develop a proposal for redirecting billions back to public coffers and investors. First, they documented the severe illiquidity and transactions costs in the municipal market and the lack of timely and useful information available to investors. Researchers estimate the annual amount that investors overpay combined with what municipalities are losing to administration and transaction costs at around $30 billion per year — interest costs to municipalities would be more than 1 percent lower if muni markets had the same liquidity as US Treasury bonds.

The solution proposed by Ang and Green could recoup many unnecessary costs associated with the muni market as it is currently organized, by creating an independent, nonprofit organization — CommonMuni — to advise issuers and provide better information to all players in the market.

CommonMuni would advise cities and states on best practices, for example, how to avoid refinancing that incurs long-term losses, or reduce costs associated with bond issues, or how and when to use derivatives with bond issues. Its other important activities, particularly early on, aim to increase transparency, since this would improve the quality and amount of information available to buyers and sellers, thereby improving liquidity.

Most importantly, CommonMuni could provide independent, high quality advice backed by its large resources to municipal issuers that would be prohibitively costly, or difficult to access, for individual municipalities to access on their own. Better structuring of municipal issues and lower issuance costs mean substantial savings to taxpayers.

CommonMuni would encourage the creation of simple bond issues, discouraging clients from structuring bond issues in overly complex ways and encouraging standardization. This would make it much easier for investors to compare bond features and prices, in turn facilitating buying and selling. Increased standardization could allow CommonMuni to pool small bond issues into larger pools, which would give smaller municipalities stronger footing in the market by broadening their potential market of buyers.

CommonMuni would help municipalities standardize, collect, and distribute financial reports, another activity aimed at improving information and transparency. CommonMuni can encourage the creation of centralized exchanges where muni bonds could be bought and sold, which would allow investors to cut out intermediaries, reducing costs.

In proposing CommonMuni, Ang and Green took many cues from the CommonFund, an investment advising nonprofit that was founded in 1971 by the Ford Foundation to help originally fewer than one hundred — now thousands — of colleges and universities pool endowment funds and obtain investment advice. The CommonFund has helped these schools dramatically reduce the costs of administering their investment programs, grow endowments, and increase endowment contributions to offset operating expenses.

Ang and Green estimate $25 million would be required to start CommonMuni. That is less than 1/10th of 1 percent of the total projected annual savings they estimate would be generated by the project. “There are few places where states and municipalities can find billions of dollars per year for effectively nothing, especially in this environment,” Ang notes.

By attracting private grant money to fund start-up costs, CommonMuni would minimize conflicts of interest that could arise with a city-, state-, or intermediary-funded effort. It would start small, offering basic services to a modest initial client base, adding services as it attracts more clients. In the beginning, some municipal officials might be reluctant to move to CommonMuni, if only out of simple resistance to change. But, once CommonMuni starts to become successful, by lowering the borrowing costs of its founding members, other municipalities will be drawn in further improving liquidity and information for all investors and issuers.

Retail investors should welcome CommonMuni as they are able to transact at better prices in more liquid markets. However, broker-dealers and financial intermediaries may lose money in a more transparent and liquid muni market, but in the long term, they would be fine, says Ang. “We once didn’t have very good disclosure for public companies. But the New Deal improved disclosure, and now everyone is better off.”

“CommonMuni is common sense, but there are a lot of players in this market who have a vested interest in the status quo and don’t want things to change,” Ang says. “But that money need not go to financial intermediaries; it belongs to taxpayers and investors.”

Central Falls Turned Upside Down By Unions

Friday, August 5th, 2011

One mans’ garbage is another mans gold. The painful truth is that as muni debt increases, so do the risks that someday it will be politically, economically and financially worthwhile for borrowers to escape it. The Central Falls bondholders seem to have dodged the bullet for now. The question is when the union sue the town, will the bondholders be vulnerable to losses as pensions and health-care obligations are re-negotiated. Muni bonds are great until your local town bond issuer declares Chapter 9 like bankruptcy. Then all bets are off until the smoke clears.

To see a real live insolvent Central Falls GO bond that last traded at 58 cents on the dollar, go to bondview. For more about this situation, here is a good piece from our smart friends at the WSJ’s Op-Ed on Muni bonds, bankruptcies and unions….

On Monday the small Rhode Island town of Central Falls declared bankruptcy because its sky-high labor costs had impaired its ability to pay its bills. The ratings agencies say the development is no surprise, but we wonder whether they’ll be saying the same thing when a bigger city falls off a cliff.

Central Falls’s financial problems are not much different from many states and municipalities. Inflexible and costly collective bargaining agreements have driven up its labor costs and crowded out services. The city is running $5 million annual structural deficits on a $16 million budget. Its pension and retiree health-care bills add up to $80 million. Public safety officers contribute a mere 7% of their salaries to pensions and can retire after 20 years with pensions equal to 50% of their final year’s salary. Such a system in which employees spend more time in retirement than working is unsustainable. Greece, Q.E.D.

In the last year the state has appointed two receivers to bring the city back from the dead, but neither has been able to repeat the miracle of Lazarus. The city’s first receiver Mark Pfeiffer raised property and car taxes by more than 20%, but higher taxes merely drove residents out of town.

In February Governor Lincoln Chafee replaced Mr. Pfeiffer with retired state supreme court judge Robert Flanders. He, too, asked the unions for concessions but came up empty-handed. Mr. Flanders then shut down the city library and community center. In a last ditch effort to save the city from bankruptcy, Mr. Flanders asked retirees to accept scaled-back pensions and to contribute more to their health benefits. The retirees overwhelmingly voted no.

The bright side of Central Falls’s saga is that it’s causing Rhode Island lawmakers to double down on pension reform. As Governor Chafee said earlier this week, “This is not just a Central Falls issue, this is a state issue.” Dozens of towns in Rhode Island, including Providence, have similar pension problems. The state’s pension system, which has a $7 billion unfunded liability, is one of the worst funded in the nation.

Mr. Chafee, an independent, and the Democratic state legislature have committed to tackling pensions in the fall. State treasurer Gina Raimondo, a Democrat, recently issued a report that suggests modifying retirees’ cost-of-living adjustments, raising the retirement age and creating new hybrid pensions that include a 401(k)-style plan and a modest defined benefit. These all sound like good ideas, but the test of Democrats’ sincerity will be when the unions turn out en masse at the capitol to denounce them for betraying their party and trashing collective bargaining.

Muni Investors Looking Good in Vallejo, CA

Saturday, May 28th, 2011

Vallejo, California, the biggest U.S. city in bankruptcy, won court permission to send its exit plan to creditors, its municipal bondholders for a vote after retired workers dropped their objections. In summary, “The plan doesn’t alter securities tied to designated revenue sources, such as about $175 million in water revenue bonds, and other special tax obligations secured by special revenue of the city’s restricted funds, according to the documents. ”

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Michael S. McManus in Sacramento, California, approved a disclosure statement for the plan in an order. McManus will take creditors’ votes into account when he decides whether to approve the plan at a hearing to be scheduled in the coming weeks. A hearing on the disclosure statement had been set for today. The retirees, represented by a court-sanctioned committee, were the last major objectors to the plan, which would cut labor costs and stretch out payments to other creditors.“The committee was concerned if the bankruptcy dragged on, their actual pensions might be jeopardized,’’ R. Dale Ginter, an attorney for the committee, said in a May 23 interview. During the bankruptcy, the city succeeded in cutting costs by firing employees, renegotiating union contracts and reducing what it pays to subsidize retiree health care. Vallejo, a onetime U.S. Navy town of about 120,000 on San Francisco Bay, sought protection from creditors in May 2008 under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, after the recession eroded tax revenue and unions rejected wage cuts. Chapter 9 allows municipalities to reorganize debt rather than liquidate. The plan doesn’t alter securities tied to designated revenue sources, such as about $175 million in water revenue bonds, and other special tax obligations secured by special revenue of the city’s restricted funds, according to the documents. The case is In re City of Vallejo, 08-26813, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of California (Sacramento).” Source: Today’s (5-27-11) Bloomberg Municipal Market Brief.

Another great American tradition is found in the millions of decisions that pass through and from our court system. We are a nation of law. We have a system that respects contracts. It carries with it the notion that obligations that are undertaken are to be fulfilled in economic terms if they are reasonable.

Vallejo’s municipal bankruptcy occurred because the politicians who ran the city ignored these fundamental values and obligated the city taxpayers to unreasonable burdens. Now the court is throwing these excessively costly burdens out. After $10 million of litigation, we are getting to some resolution. Meanwhile, please note the highlighted portion of this news report. It states that the payment stream for the essential-service revenue bond that funded the supply of water to the city is intact.

Many have emphasized importance of essential-service revenue and of the legal construction that protects these bond holders. Here is a prime example. The city is in bankruptcy, yet the bond holder is getting paid.

Reposted with permission from our friends at Cumberland Advisors.

Miami Could Have A Higher Credit Rating Than The USA

Tuesday, April 26th, 2011

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services downgraded refunded municipal bonds that were rated AAA in a follow-up to its downgrade notice of the U.S. triple-A outlook to negative from stable.

S&P suggests that in a scenario of economic or political stress a local government could have a higher credit rating than the USA. So could Miami one day have a higher credit rating than the USA? Sounds like a stretch.

Interestingly, S&P said it does not tie ratings on state and local governments to that of the United States and as a result, existing outlooks on their triple-A ratings will not change because of the revision for the federal government.

But this seems inconsistent with the market realty. The entire muni bond industry estimates prices based on various factors. The spread to the US treasury is a main criteria. BondView research So are Pre Refunded muni bonds since they are a key benchmark and are backed by US treasuries. Common sense suggests there will most certainly be a price and yield effect on the benchmark Pre Refunded muni bond since they are priced at a spread to the AAA US tres bond.

If and when the AAA US Tres is downgraded, so will Pre-Re muni bonds backed by US treasuries also known. But thats just the effect on the top of the food chain. We would expect to see a wild ride for all other muni bonds since they are also priced relative to the AAA US treasury bond. But to make matters worse, about 1/2 of all muni bonds are not rated by a major credit rating agency. These unrated muni bonds will be in worse limbo then they are today.

What S&P actually said was that only about 4 percent of state and local issues are rated AAA with a stable outlook by S&P, which said the possibility exists that a state or local government could have a higher rating than their sovereign government “in a scenario of economic or political stress.” But its a stretch to suggest that say swinging Miami, Florida could have a higher credit rating than the US government, long considered the global benchmark for stability.

To see the real effect of interest rate changes on muni bond prices, go to bondview.com, a free resource for muni bond investors.

Moodys, et.al. Goes On Strike

Friday, July 23rd, 2010

The FINREG bill signed into law this week is already creating economic casualties and a complete standstill for new bond issuance.

The problem: The main credit raters, ( Moody’s , S&P and Fitch ) said the new strict FINREG standard creates too much risk for them so they went on strike. The new law regards bond-ratings firms as “experts” and holds them liable for the quality of their ratings (imagine that?) The ratings agencies’ refusal to stand behind their own ratings shut down the $1.4 trillion market for asset-backed securities for the past few days.

Basically the credit raters played chicken against the SEC by withholding permission to use ratings on new bond issues. The problem is that big parts of the bond markets — notably the asset-backed securities — require a rating by law. Late yesterday, the SEC blinked and gave a 6 month delay to the rule.

On the ratings business there are 2 issues to balance: 1) The benefits to the marketplace of a ratings TRI-opoly protected by a government sanctioned liability shield who in return should provide objective, accurate and up to date risk assessment. VERSES 2) A free and open ratings marketplace that holds raters accountable for their expert opinions.

The larger issue is this how the government will deal with the unintended consequences of 2300 pages of Dodd-Frank? How can small business owners know which laws will be not be enforced? Will there be a list? Without a list of which laws will not be enforced, how will small business owners know if it is safe to hire employees?

What do you think?

Legal Fights Over Credit Ratings-Firm Liability Rule

Friday, June 18th, 2010

Credit raters judge risk & value and were given special limited liability privileges because investors and markets crave their expert opinions. Ideally they provide an objective baseline for consistent rating when buying stocks, muni bonds and even collectables – like coins (PCGS) or even guitars. But Moodys and S&P abused their positions at precisely the wrong time – when bond investors needed them most.

So now what? Can the marketplace innovate by encouraging bond buyers to conduct their own research or think creatively about outsourcing that job, instead of reflexively relying on S.& P., Moody’s and Fitch? Are investors willing and able to become more knowledgeable about what, what and why they buy & sell? Hopefully yes, since it will make us all better investors.

The bottom line is that the credit rating industry must be deregulated into a blended solution of legacy and non regulated ratings firms. History clearly shows that markets have the intelligence to predict bad news thru market price based rating systems. For example, to see Market Ratings for any muni bond today go to http://www.bondview.com/marketratings a free analysis tools. 

Good Luck

Jim Walker
www.BondView.com

Bond Early Warning System Needed for Monitoring Defaults

Wednesday, June 16th, 2010

How can investment advisors monitor the 1.5 million cusips from 60,000 different issuers if most bonds ratings are stale or are not rated at all? We need an Bond early warning system to identify defaults before they happen. (BWACS)

Here is the latest bond default….Facilities muni bond issuer Erickson Retirement Communities, was bought by private-equity firm Redwood Capital Investments for $365 million in a 12/09 bankruptcy auction. The muni bondholders were pummeled when paid only $3.5 million of the $95 million total debt associated with Erickson’s Chicago-area Sedgebrook assisted living complex. This according to MMA’s ever prescient Matt Fabian, the top muni research firm that tracks many of the estimated 60,000 municipal bonds on the market. Matt is quoted everywhere in the press these days, including the US Congress grilling of the muni industry. His data shows that there are 23 retirement facilities-related bond issues representing about $673 million worth of debt that have missed payments and defaulted. Another $1.4 billion of retirement bonds are either making payments from reserves or are in technical default, making the sector one of the shakiest in the still relatively sedate muni marketplace. One of the Sedgebrook bonds defaulted in December, and now trades at 14 cents on the dollar, according to MMA data.

There are retirement facilities bonds, that typically are not backed up by the full faith and credit of the state/ local government. To see the actual Sedgebrook bankruptcy filing

Mitchell Savader, CEO of Savader Asset Advisors, a municipal bond-research firm in New York, says the fate of the Sedgebrook bonds doesn’t herald a widespread collapse of the unrated muni sector. However, it should prompt calls to financial advisers for bond portfolio reviews. . “to make sure that advisers and money managers are keeping an eye on their holdings.” Good advice but how can investment advisors monitor the 1.5 million cusips from 60,000 different issuers if most bonds ratings are stale or are not rated at all? We need an Bond early warning system to identify defaults before they happen. (BWACS)