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Posts Tagged ‘Moodys’

Japan To Kick Out Ratings Agencies

Wednesday, August 11th, 2010

Japan’s has begun   severing  the global vice  grip of  the 3 major  credit raters. Make no mistake,  the  ”Keystone Cops” ( Moodys, S&P and Fitch)  once  powerful influence over nations, corporations and individual investors is coming to a major fork in the road.

Japan’s  effort to pull the rug out from beneath the credit raters appears to be a result of nations defending their  economies. The  credit raters are being  taken down a few notches as Japan basically kicks them out of te country by  enacting their own financial regulations that “are too risky to comply with”.  The same thing happened here in the  US when  the  FINREG bill signed into law in July 2010  caused  a complete standstill for new bond issuance. The new law regards bond-ratings firms as “experts” and holds them liable for the quality of their ratings (imagine that?) The ratings agencies’ refusal to stand behind their own ratings shut down the $1.4 trillion market for asset-backed securities for the past few days.

The credit  raters are their own worst enemy. These  Big 3 have lost  credibility due to conflicts of interest in how they run their own business, stale ratings, wrong ratings (ie,  Lehman has a solid rating months before they imploded. Surely if there opinions/predictions turned out to be accurate they wouldnt be in this mess.

And now the  credit raters are fielding their own set of   operational problems:  lower revenues, nations circling the wagons to break the monopolistic choke  hold , hundreds of lawsuits from investors, corporations and   sovereign states.

And to add to the lunacy,  In August 2010,  Moodys discussed   downgrading the USA’s  debt  the same week that   S&P  assigned Moodys  a ” BBB”  rating  (Now thats funny!) saying their rating reflects  litigation risk for  Moody’s due to    the recently passed financial reform legislation, which could lower the bar for investors to file securities fraud cases against ratings agencies. This is already happening for all credit raters.

Lets just say that the credit rating business is undergoing ground shifting changes that will result in a free and open competitive marketplace for ratings rather than a government sanctioned monopoly.

Good Luck to All

Andrew Ross Sorkin, from NY Times Discusses Ratings Meltdown on Brian Lehrer show (WNYC)

Friday, June 4th, 2010

Here is a good interview with our favorite radio host, Brain Lehrer from WNYC and Andrew Ross Sorkin, columnist and financial reporter for The New York Times as they discuss the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s focus on ratings agencies in today’s hearings, featuring Warren Buffet.

Stale Ratings: Testimony of Moody’s Former Head of Compliance

Friday, May 21st, 2010

Its fair to say that when rating agencies recalibrated their muni ratings in Q2 2010 to bring them in-line with other debt types, they did not conduct a credit review. Instead they unilaterally upgraded nearly all ratings at a time when all municipalities face serious financial & headline risk. We base our opinion on congressional testimony by Scott McCleskey, former head of compliance at Moody’s from 4/ 2006 to 9/ 2008 who said “in some cases there were bonds which had been outstanding for 10 or 20 years but which had never been looked at since the original rating”

Take a look or listen to “Credit Rating Agencies and the Next Financial Crisis,”hearing information. House Oversight and Government Reform Committee’s hearing . Really fascinating info that examines what role inaccurate credit ratings played in the current financial crisis, and what regulatory changes need to be implemented to prevent a future collapse.

Here is a webcast of that meeting

Good Luck

Harrisburg, PA Bond Default Notice

Friday, May 14th, 2010

The US Congress and the SEC are currently grilling CEOs of Moodys and S&P about the future of the ratings agency model. One problem is the inherent flaws due to conflicts of interest. Stale data is another.

For example, Harrisburg, PA’s incinerator bonds are in financial default. So why does Moody’s and S&P have those same defaulted bonds rated highly at AA3 and AAA? Sure the bonds are insured but it seems Harrisburg has real problems that dont jive with a top credit rating. Do you think that the next time Harrisburg tries to raise money the marketplace will agree with their wallets that these bonds deserve a AAA rating? Uhhhh No.

History clearly shows that markets have the intelligence to predict bad news thru market price based rating systems. To see Market Ratings for your muni bonds, check out www.bondview.com , a free analysis tools for muni bond investors.

What does a real bond default look like? Here is the default notice
Here is the default notice

Harrisburg Bonds May Incinerate Value ( 41473EFH9 )

Thursday, February 18th, 2010

Buffet says ” when the tide goes out, you get to see who is swimming naked”.

Harrisburg bonds (41473EFH9) are a mess due to what appears to be wasteful spending. Is this representative of a nationwide muni default? In a word NO. So what happened in Harrisburg?

According to our sources, the Harrisburg incinerator that will likely burn bondholders was an mechanical engineering boondoggle dating back to its inception and went through several refits in an attempt to get it functioning to meet environmental standards. But by then it had acquired so much debt, it could not possibly cover its costs. So now the city and Dauphin County are on the hook for what amounts to about $10k per citizen!

Here is the list of this bond’s trades.

It hasnt traded Nov 2008. The lack of interest in trading this bear is no surprise since the Harrisburg municipality filed a July 2009 material events notice .

The former Mayor Reed – king of the city for 24 years may have tried to make the city a better place to live but the spending went far out of control. He spent tens of millions building the “national” civil war museum even thought Gettysburg is just a 45 minute drive from Harrisburg with it’s own museum run by the national park system. When it was obviously not performing, the Mayor argued it was because the city needed a critical mass of museums before it could be a success. So he planned 5 more including a wild west themed museum! He spent tens of millions on acquiring artifacts, the purchase of which he allegedly personally handled. When finally forced to sell these, the city got less than 20 cents on the dollar. Turns out he’s quite the history buff and many of the artifacts allegedly decorated his office while awaiting the building of the museums. Gee if a small business owner did that an IRS agent would have a field day. But since it was public monies that were spent, no crime but certainly a foul.

This is a case of public spending gone crazy. Where were the auditors? Lumped on top of this self created mess is the local government cant afford to continue to platinum healthcare & pension benefits to police, fire and teachers. In good times, fat pensions stress cities’ finances and increase our taxes. But In bad times , these debts break the camels back .

Good media sources on this topic include the excellent WSJ article “ Muni Threat: Cities Weigh Chapter 9 (2/18/10) Harrisburg Authority, city miss debt payment; Dauphin County pays”

Thats said, the Harrisburg bond problem doesnt seem representative of a nationwide muni default. With muni rates still low, the problem is a sick facility pushed over the edge due to unique bad economic times. What is interesting is cities may well choose, or be forced to use Chapter 9 causing sweet-hart city employee union contracts to be squeezed followed by layoffs. But bondholders will suffer too. Interest payments may be frozen, effected bonds prices will drop 50%+ and when the dust settles, private equity players will swoop in and buy the distressed assets on the cheap. Bahhh and good luck to all

Muni Bond Defaults Need A louder Alarm

Tuesday, December 1st, 2009

Less than a month before the $43.4 million municipal bond default of Boston based Crosstown Center , some unsuspecting retail buyer purchased $100,000 of the now defaulted bonds. Whats troubling is that this purchase was made just 18 days after a rather cryptic material event notice filed thru the EMMA.org continuing disclosure system.

While we are really thrilled to see the positive strides made by the Municipal Securities Rule Making Board and its rather lovely www.emma.org muni bond continuing disclosure system, the impact of material event notices need to be made clearer to the consumer marketplace. Sure “Material Events” can cover a wide range of topics from benign notices to the Crosstown Center disaster. Even with low muni rates, how and when is a consumer suppose to know to watch their muni bonds for falling trees? How about a rating system for these material events on a 1-10 scale from insignificant to “timber….”. After all what good is a warning bell if no one hears it?

Enough with the complaints. How about a solution? History clearly shows that markets have the intelligence to predict bad news thru market price based rating systems. Some of the larger credit rating agencies even offer these products pricing products. But the consumer market doesn’t seem educated to the benefit of these smart market priced based credit ratings. However, Bondview has built in Market Ratings along with bond pricing of muni bonds and muni rates.

Okay then how about the original rating? The defaulted bonds carried a Moody’s rating of Baa3 when issued in 2002. How is it possible to loose $43 million so fast without the rating agencies even noticing?

We can only again recommend our esteemed NY Times colleague Gretchen Morgenson’s 10/10/09 article “When Bond Ratings Get Stale”. Within this well penned piece was detailed the most colorful of quotes during congressional hearings with Scott McCleskey, head of compliance at Moody’s from April 2006 to September 2008. He outlined Moodys failure to effectively monitor the ratings on thousands of muni bonds held by individual and institutional investors. McCleskey said that “in some cases there were bonds which had been outstanding for 10 or 20 years but which had never been looked at since the original rating. In the case of the Crosstown default, its only been 7 years.

In closing, its troubling that somehow Boston is not a “party to the default”and just goes to show that muni bonds really can be a mine field. Even the smart money didn’t see that train wreck coming. Several bond funds including muni bond powerhouse Nuveen, thru its Massachusetts Premium Income Municipal Fund, held Crosstown Center bonds valued at $963,000, according to a recent securities filing. Here are BondView’s yield curves of yesterdays Industrial Development Bonds trades from Massachusetts. They dont look bad now, but a good idea to steer clear of this category if they don’t have the full faith and credit of the municipality behind them.

AMBAC Bites The Dust…?

Wednesday, November 11th, 2009

About 10 years ago my muni bond broker said the “day insurers of muni bonds cant pay off a defaulted bond you will have bigger problems on your hands” , implying such an event would never happen. Well he was right about big problems.  Bond insurers sent shudders through the $2.8 trillion municipal bond market when the threat to their internal triple-A credit ratings surfaced two years ago. But now that one of the biggest, Ambac, has said it may actually tip into bankruptcy, the market  barely cares.  With muni rates at all time lows, and bond pricing all over the place, bond insurance is a laughable notion. Up until  a few years ago any old municipality could buy a AAA bond rating bond insruance  helped  foster an environment where the AAA muni was  a commodity that was  easily traded. Many investors didnt care about the all important underlying rating of a muni and instead bought by issuing insured bonds. The underlying rating was meaningless since buyers thought they just wanted a commodity: The AAA Bond. We know now that  was a mistake, hopefully never to be repeated.

In the heyday of bond insurance, seven firms carried the top credit rating of triple-A, and half of new municipal bonds carried insurance. Now, barely 10% of new muni bonds have insurance. None have retained triple-A ratings and all but one, Assured,  have junk ratings! Their downfall came after the top insurers branched out to guarantee complex mortgage securities. When the housing market tanked, insurers saw their losses grow, their ratings fall and their clients flee.

What does this mean for today?  The muni bond market has largely taken its losses and has withstood the turmoil seen with the weakest of the insurers. Besides Ambac,  MBIA  posted its fifth straight quarterly loss earlier this year and its public finance insurance spinoff  is being challenged by banks, which say such a split is fraudulent.  Here is a list of  today’s insured bonds  trading info from BondView

Critics Complain of Bond Raters’ Conflicts at US Congress Hearings

Sunday, October 11th, 2009

Reading thru  Jeffrey R. Kosnett column from Kiplinger  ”Beyond bond ratings”, (Oct 7, 2009 )

Ten year ago , the major ratings firms ( Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s)  offered no warnings about  scandals brewing at Enron and WorldCom before the firms collapsed. More recently,  raters missed the troubles at Lehman Brothers, AIG,  and other financial institutions, not to mention subprime-mortgage securities.  Critics  complain at congressional hearings and elsewhere, that ratings agencies are “hopelessly compromised”  by a business model in which they receive fees from the very bond issuers the public expects them to judge impartially. Can muni bond holders really rely on legacy credit ratings?

Moodys Should Disclose When A Ratings Or Rerating Was Given

Sunday, October 11th, 2009

Would you want to own muni bond  that hasn’t been given a sniff test for 20 years?  Well this is a common concern for muni investors according to  the N.Y. Times  “When Bond Ratings Get Stale” (10/11/09). We were not surprised by Moody’s alleged failure to monitor older ratings on many thousands of municipal bonds held by individual and institutional investors.  Former Moodys’ senior  employee  Scott McCleskey, head of compliance at Moody’s from April 2006 to September 2008,  outlined his employer’s failures to the US Congress this week and claimed that once Moody’s issues these ratings, it rarely reviews them again — leaving them fallow, sometimes for decades, a concern echoed by other former Moody’s employees. One way to resolve this glaring problem is  for agencies to disclose exactly when a ratings or rerating was given.