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Posts Tagged ‘Muni bond Defualts’

Harrisburg, The Saga Continues

Wednesday, October 26th, 2011

Reports from Bloomberg were that Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett and the Harrisburg City Council are in a standoff resulting from Harrisburg’s filing of Chapter 9 bankruptcy last week. The governor is looking to overrule the city council’s action and have the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania take over the finances of the city.

The story – often reported by our friends at Cumberland Advisors – is that of an incinerator that was not needed, but built as a boondoggle. After failing to attract enough business, the city decided to spend much more money retrofitting the incinerator, putting the city’s pledge behind the bonds used to finance and retrofit. This turned into a disaster. The city stopped making payments on the incinerator debt last year. With much consternation and discussion, they have continued to pay debt service on their general-obligation bonds.

Last week the city council voted to declare Chapter 9 bankruptcy for Harrisburg, even though the Mayor of Harrisburg was against it and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania itself had passed a law declaring that it would be illegal for Harrisburg to declare bankruptcy.

There is now a court-mandated delay of a month to sort this out. On Monday, a judge for the US Bankruptcy Court in Pennsylvania set a November 23 court date to settle the legality of the bankruptcy declaration by the council.

Why is the state moving as if the matter has already been settled in its favor? It’s not just the politics, it’s the state not wanting Harrisburg’s woes to result in much higher borrowing costs for towns and cities in the rest of central Pennsylvania.

What do we see reflected in the municipal bond market, given the current state of affairs?

Most of the Harrisburg general-obligation debt is insured. Ratings on Harrisburg itself have been withdrawn by the rating agencies. Bonds backed by Assured Guaranty, the healthiest of the bond insurers (AA3 Moody’s and AA+ Standard and Poor’s) are trading at 5.5% to 6%. Bonds from downgraded insurer MBIA (now National RE), rated Baa1/BBB, are trading in the 6.25-6.50% range, and bonds with other insurers who are below investment-grade and have no rating are all over the lot, with trades in the 7%-plus range (levels courtesy of Oppenheimer). This is in a world where longer-maturity, high-grade Pennsylvania debt is trading in the 4.5% range.

The one thing we know for sure is that the bond insurers come down squarely of the opinion that Harrisburg has NOT taken the necessary steps to avoid bankruptcy: raising taxes, selling assets, and using their full faith and credit to pay their bonds.

So far, this has not carried over to the state’s own bonds, as far as any patina of higher yields associated with the problems of Harrisburg. The state sold bonds this week at their normal high-grade level.

Stay tuned as this develops.

Reprinted by permission from our friends at Cumberland Advisors

The US Downgrade and the Muni Bonds

Wednesday, August 10th, 2011

We have fielded many questions in the last few days about what effect the downgrade of the United States debt from AAA to AA+ and the effect on the 11,000 or so municipal bonds that S&P subsequently downgraded. Investors and professionals want to know what they should do with the muin bond portfolios.

The bonds that may be effected most include Housing bonds (bonds with the backing of federal agencies like GNMA and FNMA) will see their S&P ratings affected. Certain lease bonds with the federal government as a tenant may see their ratings downgraded, depending on the proportion that the federal government is responsible for on the leases

Pre refunded and escrowed municipal bonds, the gold standard for munis: These are generally older, higher-coupon bonds that have been defeased by their issuers. Proceeds of “refunding” issues are placed in Treasury securities to pay interest and call the older bonds at the first call date. This results in significant cost savings for the municipalities, and the older bonds are often (but not always) re-rated AAA based on the US Treasuries, which are now backing the older bonds. These bonds will see a downgrade.

What does this mean from a portfolio-management sense? In our view, it should not affect the muni market greatly. In our opinion, the United States is still the premier sovereign credit in the world. Investors will continue to own prerefunded bonds in the shorter-maturity end of a barbell strategy.

It is important to remember that both Moody’s and Fitch continue to rate the US as “AAA” including housing bonds backed by the federal government or prerefunded bonds or bonds backed by federal leases. As strange as it sounds, because state and local governments and their agencies are rated on different criteria than governments, some municipal issuers will have S&P credit ratings higher than the federal government.

The smart muni bond professionals who fly in our circle are saying the municipal marketplace will still react to the same forces it has in the past: high demand for tax free bonds propping up prices due to low supply, retail buy and hold investors ignoring much of the fray, bond fund redemptions of high quality bonds causing a pricing ripple effect on on all other muni bonds and the lack of clear insight into the why and how of credit ratings.

MSRB Steps Up Its Game To Warn “Play Fair or Else”

Monday, August 8th, 2011

The MSRB took a defensive posture in the wake of the S&P’s downgrade on the USA by warning dealers that despite the potential market disruption, investor protection rules continue to apply and that all trading activity will be monitored as usual. As an example the MSRB said it would be unfair for a bond purchase by a dealer at a low price followed by a resale shortly thereafter at a considerably higher price. What effect this will have on the markets are unclear until we see the trickle down to prices as a result of S&P’s downgrade on the USA’s long term debt. Here is the release or you can read below

MSRB INFORMATION RELEASE As a result of actions and statements by certain Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations regarding the credit rating of the United States and the associated review of scurities of some states and municipalities, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) is publishing a reminder to dealers relating to the application of MSRB investor protection rules in the context of the potential impact of such ratings action on the municipal securities market.

The MSRB reminds brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers that, in spite of any market disruption that may result from such rating actions, all MSRB rules continue to apply, including rules on fair practice, trade pricing, suitability and disclosure.

MSRB ADVISES DEALERS ON CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS IN LIGHT OF POTENTIAL MUNICIPAL RATINGS ACTIONS
On August 5, 2011, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Service reduced the sovereign credit rating of the United States from “AAA” to “AA+.” On August 2, 2011, Moody’s Investors Service (“Moody’s”) confirmed its United States government bond rating at “Aaa,” although Moody’s assigned the rating a “negative outlook.” On August 2, 2011, Fitch Ratings announced that it has maintained its “AAA” U.S. sovereign debt rating but said that it continued to review the credit and expected that the review would be complete by the end of August 2011. Certain of these Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (“Rating Agencies”) have also said that the securities of some states and municipalities are under review for possible downgrade as a result of their direct or indirect links to the credit of the United States. They had previously stated that, should they take negative rating actions on the debt of the United States, they also would likely downgrade debt directly or indirectly linked to the United States sovereign rating, as well as the ratings of certain municipal issuers that either have large numbers of federal employees in their jurisdiction or that are significantly reliant on federal government funding.

Although to date the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”) has observed no unusual municipal market activity, as a result of this continuing uncertainty concerning the ratings of such states and local governments the MSRB is publishing this reminder notice relating to the application of MSRB investor protection rules in the context of the potential impact of such ratings actions on the municipal securities market.

The MSRB reminds brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) that, in spite of any market disruption that may result from such rating actions, all MSRB rules continue to apply, including rules on fair practice, trade pricing, suitability and disclosure. The MSRB is particularly concerned about the treatment of retail investors. MSRB Rule G-17 prohibits dealers from using a situation of market disruption to attempt to manipulate the pricing of municipal securities, either alone or in concert. Further, such situation does not negate a dealer’s duty under MSRB Rule G-30 (on prices and commissions) to purchase bonds from a customer or sell bonds to a customer as a principal at prices (including any markdown or markup) that are fair and reasonable based on prevailing market conditions.

As always, if the MSRB becomes aware of allegations that any dealer has attempted to take advantage of clients by trading in municipal securities at prices that are not fair and reasonable, the MSRB will notify the appropriate enforcement agencies and, if the allegations are true, recommend severe sanctions. One potential indication of such unfair behavior would be a purchase by a dealer at a low price followed by a resale shortly thereafter at a considerably higher price. While the MSRB recognizes that market disruption can present significant challenges to establishing a fair and reasonable price with precision, Rules G-17 and G-30 do not permit dealers to improperly take advantage of their clients by executing trades at prices that are not fair and reasonable. The MSRB encourages dealers that utilize computerized or other pricing models to review them carefully to determine that the prices they generate are fair and reasonable, particularly if such models were not designed to take into consideration the direct or indirect impact of a material downgrade in United States credit ratings.

The exretailistence of a market disruption also does not negate a dealer’s duty to ensure that their recommendations are consistent with their obligations under MSRB Rule G-19 (on suitability of recommendations), which can be a significant concern in the context of investors who may rely on the recommendations of their dealers during this time of uncertainty. Further, dealers are reminded that all material facts concerning a transaction known to the dealer or available from established industry sources must be disclosed to the client at or prior to the time of sale, under MSRB Rule G-17.

The MSRB will continue to monitor developments in the marketplace and any potential concerns resulting from any ratings actions.

August 8, 2011

Cleaning Up the Muni Market

Sunday, August 7th, 2011

Two well professors are proposing that states and localities create a national nonprofit institution that would provide issuers with independent advice on bond financings, help them disclose standardized information and take other steps to improve liquidity in the muni market. Professor Andrew Ang from Columbia University and Richard Greene from Carnegie Mellon says an independent, non-profit advisory organization for municipalities could increase transparency and liquidity in the muni bond market, sweeping billions of dollars back to taxpayers and investors. Economists and taxpayers, safe to say, always share at least one perspective: they hate to see inefficient markets because that means money is going to waste. Municipal bond markets are highly inefficient and could benefit from a good clean up to turn billions of dollars in back to investors and municipalities — and by extension, to taxpayers.

The value that is being siphoned away through the muni market, Professor Andrew Ang says, can be attributed to two flaws: the market is both highly illiquid and very opaque, costing investors and municipalities billions of dollars every year.

When states, cities, and other municipalities issue bonds to raise money for public projects, they depend on intermediary brokers to match them with buyers. These buyers face difficulties in selling these bonds if they require their invested capital back early because secondary markets are illiquid and trading costs are extremely high. Furthermore, no standard system exists to get timely, accurate information about the roughly 1.5 million bond issues on the market, or the financial condition of any of the 50,000-plus institutions that issue municipal bonds.

In practical terms, then, it’s difficult to meaningfully compare bond prices and other important market information valuable to buyers and sellers. “In any type of market where you have illiquidity and poor information, bad things happen,” Ang says. “In the muni market, that means unnecessary costs in the forms of interest expense, fees from brokers, and other transaction costs for investors and issuers.”

Ang worked with fellow economist Richard Green of Carnegie Mellon to develop a proposal for redirecting billions back to public coffers and investors. First, they documented the severe illiquidity and transactions costs in the municipal market and the lack of timely and useful information available to investors. Researchers estimate the annual amount that investors overpay combined with what municipalities are losing to administration and transaction costs at around $30 billion per year — interest costs to municipalities would be more than 1 percent lower if muni markets had the same liquidity as US Treasury bonds.

The solution proposed by Ang and Green could recoup many unnecessary costs associated with the muni market as it is currently organized, by creating an independent, nonprofit organization — CommonMuni — to advise issuers and provide better information to all players in the market.

CommonMuni would advise cities and states on best practices, for example, how to avoid refinancing that incurs long-term losses, or reduce costs associated with bond issues, or how and when to use derivatives with bond issues. Its other important activities, particularly early on, aim to increase transparency, since this would improve the quality and amount of information available to buyers and sellers, thereby improving liquidity.

Most importantly, CommonMuni could provide independent, high quality advice backed by its large resources to municipal issuers that would be prohibitively costly, or difficult to access, for individual municipalities to access on their own. Better structuring of municipal issues and lower issuance costs mean substantial savings to taxpayers.

CommonMuni would encourage the creation of simple bond issues, discouraging clients from structuring bond issues in overly complex ways and encouraging standardization. This would make it much easier for investors to compare bond features and prices, in turn facilitating buying and selling. Increased standardization could allow CommonMuni to pool small bond issues into larger pools, which would give smaller municipalities stronger footing in the market by broadening their potential market of buyers.

CommonMuni would help municipalities standardize, collect, and distribute financial reports, another activity aimed at improving information and transparency. CommonMuni can encourage the creation of centralized exchanges where muni bonds could be bought and sold, which would allow investors to cut out intermediaries, reducing costs.

In proposing CommonMuni, Ang and Green took many cues from the CommonFund, an investment advising nonprofit that was founded in 1971 by the Ford Foundation to help originally fewer than one hundred — now thousands — of colleges and universities pool endowment funds and obtain investment advice. The CommonFund has helped these schools dramatically reduce the costs of administering their investment programs, grow endowments, and increase endowment contributions to offset operating expenses.

Ang and Green estimate $25 million would be required to start CommonMuni. That is less than 1/10th of 1 percent of the total projected annual savings they estimate would be generated by the project. “There are few places where states and municipalities can find billions of dollars per year for effectively nothing, especially in this environment,” Ang notes.

By attracting private grant money to fund start-up costs, CommonMuni would minimize conflicts of interest that could arise with a city-, state-, or intermediary-funded effort. It would start small, offering basic services to a modest initial client base, adding services as it attracts more clients. In the beginning, some municipal officials might be reluctant to move to CommonMuni, if only out of simple resistance to change. But, once CommonMuni starts to become successful, by lowering the borrowing costs of its founding members, other municipalities will be drawn in further improving liquidity and information for all investors and issuers.

Retail investors should welcome CommonMuni as they are able to transact at better prices in more liquid markets. However, broker-dealers and financial intermediaries may lose money in a more transparent and liquid muni market, but in the long term, they would be fine, says Ang. “We once didn’t have very good disclosure for public companies. But the New Deal improved disclosure, and now everyone is better off.”

“CommonMuni is common sense, but there are a lot of players in this market who have a vested interest in the status quo and don’t want things to change,” Ang says. “But that money need not go to financial intermediaries; it belongs to taxpayers and investors.”

Miami Could Have A Higher Credit Rating Than The USA

Tuesday, April 26th, 2011

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services downgraded refunded municipal bonds that were rated AAA in a follow-up to its downgrade notice of the U.S. triple-A outlook to negative from stable.

S&P suggests that in a scenario of economic or political stress a local government could have a higher credit rating than the USA. So could Miami one day have a higher credit rating than the USA? Sounds like a stretch.

Interestingly, S&P said it does not tie ratings on state and local governments to that of the United States and as a result, existing outlooks on their triple-A ratings will not change because of the revision for the federal government.

But this seems inconsistent with the market realty. The entire muni bond industry estimates prices based on various factors. The spread to the US treasury is a main criteria. BondView research So are Pre Refunded muni bonds since they are a key benchmark and are backed by US treasuries. Common sense suggests there will most certainly be a price and yield effect on the benchmark Pre Refunded muni bond since they are priced at a spread to the AAA US tres bond.

If and when the AAA US Tres is downgraded, so will Pre-Re muni bonds backed by US treasuries also known. But thats just the effect on the top of the food chain. We would expect to see a wild ride for all other muni bonds since they are also priced relative to the AAA US treasury bond. But to make matters worse, about 1/2 of all muni bonds are not rated by a major credit rating agency. These unrated muni bonds will be in worse limbo then they are today.

What S&P actually said was that only about 4 percent of state and local issues are rated AAA with a stable outlook by S&P, which said the possibility exists that a state or local government could have a higher rating than their sovereign government “in a scenario of economic or political stress.” But its a stretch to suggest that say swinging Miami, Florida could have a higher credit rating than the US government, long considered the global benchmark for stability.

To see the real effect of interest rate changes on muni bond prices, go to bondview.com, a free resource for muni bond investors.

Harrisburg Bonds May Incinerate Value ( 41473EFH9 )

Thursday, February 18th, 2010

Buffet says ” when the tide goes out, you get to see who is swimming naked”.

Harrisburg bonds (41473EFH9) are a mess due to what appears to be wasteful spending. Is this representative of a nationwide muni default? In a word NO. So what happened in Harrisburg?

According to our sources, the Harrisburg incinerator that will likely burn bondholders was an mechanical engineering boondoggle dating back to its inception and went through several refits in an attempt to get it functioning to meet environmental standards. But by then it had acquired so much debt, it could not possibly cover its costs. So now the city and Dauphin County are on the hook for what amounts to about $10k per citizen!

Here is the list of this bond’s trades.

It hasnt traded Nov 2008. The lack of interest in trading this bear is no surprise since the Harrisburg municipality filed a July 2009 material events notice .

The former Mayor Reed – king of the city for 24 years may have tried to make the city a better place to live but the spending went far out of control. He spent tens of millions building the “national” civil war museum even thought Gettysburg is just a 45 minute drive from Harrisburg with it’s own museum run by the national park system. When it was obviously not performing, the Mayor argued it was because the city needed a critical mass of museums before it could be a success. So he planned 5 more including a wild west themed museum! He spent tens of millions on acquiring artifacts, the purchase of which he allegedly personally handled. When finally forced to sell these, the city got less than 20 cents on the dollar. Turns out he’s quite the history buff and many of the artifacts allegedly decorated his office while awaiting the building of the museums. Gee if a small business owner did that an IRS agent would have a field day. But since it was public monies that were spent, no crime but certainly a foul.

This is a case of public spending gone crazy. Where were the auditors? Lumped on top of this self created mess is the local government cant afford to continue to platinum healthcare & pension benefits to police, fire and teachers. In good times, fat pensions stress cities’ finances and increase our taxes. But In bad times , these debts break the camels back .

Good media sources on this topic include the excellent WSJ article “ Muni Threat: Cities Weigh Chapter 9 (2/18/10) Harrisburg Authority, city miss debt payment; Dauphin County pays”

Thats said, the Harrisburg bond problem doesnt seem representative of a nationwide muni default. With muni rates still low, the problem is a sick facility pushed over the edge due to unique bad economic times. What is interesting is cities may well choose, or be forced to use Chapter 9 causing sweet-hart city employee union contracts to be squeezed followed by layoffs. But bondholders will suffer too. Interest payments may be frozen, effected bonds prices will drop 50%+ and when the dust settles, private equity players will swoop in and buy the distressed assets on the cheap. Bahhh and good luck to all

AMBAC Bites The Dust…?

Wednesday, November 11th, 2009

About 10 years ago my muni bond broker said the “day insurers of muni bonds cant pay off a defaulted bond you will have bigger problems on your hands” , implying such an event would never happen. Well he was right about big problems.  Bond insurers sent shudders through the $2.8 trillion municipal bond market when the threat to their internal triple-A credit ratings surfaced two years ago. But now that one of the biggest, Ambac, has said it may actually tip into bankruptcy, the market  barely cares.  With muni rates at all time lows, and bond pricing all over the place, bond insurance is a laughable notion. Up until  a few years ago any old municipality could buy a AAA bond rating bond insruance  helped  foster an environment where the AAA muni was  a commodity that was  easily traded. Many investors didnt care about the all important underlying rating of a muni and instead bought by issuing insured bonds. The underlying rating was meaningless since buyers thought they just wanted a commodity: The AAA Bond. We know now that  was a mistake, hopefully never to be repeated.

In the heyday of bond insurance, seven firms carried the top credit rating of triple-A, and half of new municipal bonds carried insurance. Now, barely 10% of new muni bonds have insurance. None have retained triple-A ratings and all but one, Assured,  have junk ratings! Their downfall came after the top insurers branched out to guarantee complex mortgage securities. When the housing market tanked, insurers saw their losses grow, their ratings fall and their clients flee.

What does this mean for today?  The muni bond market has largely taken its losses and has withstood the turmoil seen with the weakest of the insurers. Besides Ambac,  MBIA  posted its fifth straight quarterly loss earlier this year and its public finance insurance spinoff  is being challenged by banks, which say such a split is fraudulent.  Here is a list of  today’s insured bonds  trading info from BondView

Special Assessment Bonds Trigger 2009 Muni Defaults

Thursday, October 15th, 2009

Muni bond defaults moved past $4 billion from January thru September 2009  driven partly by the bursting of the real estate bubble which in turn  triggered  defaults in “Special Assessment” bonds, according to the Distressed Debt Securities Newsletter and Bloomberg.

The problem is caused by builders who issued tax-exempt bonds backed by these Special Assessment bonds to finance infrastructure, such as  new schools. Builders are not paying the tax debt as houses go unsold and land  values decline. For example  in Adelanto, California, about $17 million in  bonds defaulted as school construction proceeded faster than  home building. The real estate crash caused fewer people to move into the area which means less tax revenue to support new schools. Special Assessment bonds are a real specialty area.

BondView.com can help you learn more about Special Assessment bonds…. 1) Take a look at all California Special Assessment bonds traded within the last 24 hours, see up to date yield curves for these bonds, or get an objective view of own muni bond portfolio. Or 2) For more info about Special Assessment Bonds contact an industry leader: David Taussig & Associates

(In the interests of full disclosure,  BondView is not paid for this recommendation. We are just sharing our industry contacts with you.)